Three Sisters Sportswear Co., Bedford Cutting Mills, Inc., Three Sisters Apparel Corp., Metropolitan Sweater Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Ltd., Skylight Fashions, Inc. d/b/a Skylight Trading, and 144 Spencer Realty Corp. *and* International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO *and* Local 17-18, United Production Workers' Union,[1] Party In Interest

Local 17-18, United Production Workers' Union *and* International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO. Cases 29–CA–14046, 29–CA–14495, 29–CA–14517, 29–CA–14518, 29–CA–14535, 29–CA–14617, 29–CA–14625, 29–CA–14758, 29–CA–15095, 29–CA–15646, 29–CA–15653, 29–CA–15720, 29–CA–15740, and 29–CB–7505

September 30, 1993

DECISION AND ORDER

BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH

On January 15, 1993, Administrative Law Judge Steven B. Fish issued the attached decision. The Respondent-Companies filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief.

The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision and record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,[2] and conclusions,[3] and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.

1. The Respondent-Companies have excepted to the judge's findings that the named Respondent-Companies are a single employer and alter egos of each other. We agree with the judge's findings for the reasons set forth in his decision.[4] See *Imco/International Measurement Co*., 304 NLRB 738 (1991), enfd. 978 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992). We also agree with the judge's findings that the Respondent-Companies violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the discriminatory treatment of Carmen Nieves, Bella Martinez, Israel Galarza, Rosita Chalston,[5] and Silvia Silverio.

2. The Respondent-Companies have excepted to the judge's recommendation that special access remedies be provided to the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO. We agree with the judge that these remedies are appropriate and necessary to dissipate the effects of the Respondent-Companies' flagrant and extensive unfair labor practices.[6] See *S. E. Nichols, Inc*., 284 NLRB 556 (1987), enfd. in relevant part 862 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1988).

3. The Respondent-Companies have excepted to the judge's recommendation that Beirel Jacobowitz be required to read the notice to assembled employees. We agree with the judge to the extent that Beirel Jacobowitz be ordered to sign the notice and be present while the notice is read. We shall, however, modify the recommended Order to provide that Beirel Jacobowitz, at his option, either read the notice or be present while the notice is read by a Board agent. In requiring Beirel Jacobowitz to personally read the notice or to be present while it is read, we emphasize that Beirel Jacobowitz personally committed the majority of the 8(a)(1) violations and personally engaged in the discriminatory treatment of four of the five discriminatees. In view of his pervasive personal involvement in serious unfair labor practices, we conclude that his reading of the notice or his presence while it is read is necessary to dispel the atmosphere of intimidation he created. *Monfort of Colorado*, 284 NLRB 1429 (1987), enfd. sub nom. *Commercial Workers v. NLRB*, 852 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In providing that Beirel Jacobowitz may elect to have the notice read by a Board agent rather than to read it himself, we are mindful of the Second Circuit's decision in *S. E. Nichols*, supra, modifying the Board's Order that the company president personally read the notice by alternatively providing that the notice may be read by a Board agent.

4. Finally, as a substantial number of the Respondent-Companies' employees are primarily Spanish speaking,[7] we shall modify the recommended Order to make clear that the notice to employees be posted, mailed, published, and read in Spanish, as well as in English.[8]

[1] The name of the Party in Interest is corrected to read as alleged in the complaint.

[2] The Respondent-Companies have excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. *Standard Dry Wall Products*, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.

[3] No exceptions were filed with respect to the independent 8(a)(1) and (2) findings. In addition, no exceptions were filed with respect to the judge's dismissal of the 8(b)(1)(A) complaint allegations.

[4] We note that the parties stipulated that Three Sisters Sportswear Co. and Three Sisters Apparel Corp. are the same company and that United Knitwear Industries, Inc. and United Knitwear Industries, Ltd. are the same company.

Member Raudabaugh agrees that the Respondents constitute a single employer. He does not pass on the judge's additional conclusion that they are alter egos of each other.

[5] No exceptions were filed with respect to the findings regarding Chalston.

[6] We shall correct the judge's inadvertent omission from the notice to employees of the requirement that the Respondent-Companies provide access by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union to the plant's bulletin boards and other places where notices are kept.

[7] All 10 employees who testified at the hearing did so with the help of an interpreter.

[8] The judge provided that the notice should be posted and mailed in Spanish and English.

The judge recommended that the Respondent-Companies be ordered to publish the notice in two newspapers of general circulation, including *El Diario*, a Spanish publication. We shall modify the recommended Order to provide that the notice be published in *El Diario* in Spanish and in another newspaper of general circulation in English. We shall also modify the recommended Order to require the Respondent-Companies to afford the Board a reasonable opportunity to provide a Board agent to read the notice, if Beirel Jacobowitz chooses not to do so, and to provide for an interpreter to read the notice in Spanish.

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Respondent-Companies, Three Sisters Sportswear Co., Bedford Cutting Mills, Inc., Three Sisters Apparel Corp., Metropolitan Sweater Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Ltd., Skylight Fashions, Inc. d/b/a Skylight Trading, and 144 Spencer Realty Corp., Brooklyn, New York, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.

1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(k).

''(k) Publish in two newspapers of general circulation copies of the attached notice marked 'Appendix.' The notice shall be published twice weekly for a period of 4 weeks. One of the newspapers shall be *El Diario*; the Spanish translation of the notice shall be published in that newspaper. The notice, in English, shall be published in the other newspaper.''

2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(l).

''(l) Convene during working time all employees at the Brooklyn plant, by shifts, departments, or otherwise, and have Beirel Jacobowitz read to the assembled employees the contents of the attached notice marked 'Appendix,' or at Beirel Jacobowitz' option, permit a Board agent to read the notice. If Beirel Jacobowitz chooses to have a Board agent read the notice, he shall be present while the notice is read. In addition, he shall be present while the Spanish translation of the notice is read to assembled employees by a Board agent or by a Board provided interpreter. The Board shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to provide for the presence of a Board agent and an interpreter at any assembly called for the purpose of reading the notice.''

3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge.

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT layoff, discharge, issue written warnings to, or otherwise discriminate against our employees because of their support for or activities on behalf of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO (the ILG), or because our employees engaged in other protected concerted activity or because a charge has been filed on behalf of our employees with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT verbally abuse, physically assault, block our employees from exiting our office, isolate the work stations of our employees, instruct our mechanics not to fix machines of our employees on request, make more complicated and fewer assignments to our employees, forcing our employees to wait longer for assignments than other employees, supervise our employees more closely, instruct our employees not to speak with other employees, reduce the bonus or the pay of our employees, or have our supervisor clap their hands whenever an employee looks up from their work, because of our employees support for or activities on behalf of the ILG or because they engaged in other protected concerted activity, or because a charge has been filed on behalf of our employees at the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT order and instruct our employees not to accept and to rip up literature from the ILG, refer to the ILG as the MAFIA, promise our employees benefits to assist us in soliciting support for Local 17-18 from other employees, threaten our employees with discharge or closing of the factory if they support the ILG or if the ILG comes into the factory, threaten our employees with unspecified reprisals if they speak to employees who support the ILG, or create the impression among our employees that their activities or the activities of their fellow employees on behalf of the ILG were under surveillance by us.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL offer Israel Galarza and Silvia Silverio immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent

positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.

WE WILL make whole Galarza, Silverio, Carmen Nieves, Bella Martinez, and Rosita Chalston for any loss of earnings and other benefits, suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, including the reduction of work opportunities for Nieves and the reduction of Galarza's pay and bonus.

WE WILL remove from our files any reference to our unlawful actions taken against Silverio, Nieves, Chalston, Martinez, and Galarza, and notify them in writing that this has been done and that the actions will not be used against them in any way.

WE WILL restore the pay of Israel Galarza to what it had been prior to its reduction in March 1991, plus any raises which he may have received since that time.

WE WILL rescind in writing the instruction that our employees are no longer allowed to speak with Carmen Nieves, and our instructions that her machine will not be fixed by the mechanic at her request, and notify Nieves in writing that this has been done, and distribute a copy of this notice of recession to all employees.

WE WILL restore the work station of Nieves to what it had been prior to her termination on November 19, 1989.

WE WILL restore our practice, which had been in effect prior to November 19, 1989, of assigning Nieves to an amount of bundles equal to that of other employees.

WE WILL mail copies of this notice signed by Beirel Jacobowitz, our chief operating official, to every employee working at our plant on the date on which such notice is mailed, as well as to each and every employee who worked or should have worked in our plant since November 1989.

WE WILL publish in two newspapers of general circulation copies of this notice. The notice shall be published twice weekly for a period of 4 weeks. One of the newspapers shall be *El Diario*; the Spanish translation of the notice shall be published in that newspaper. The notice, in English, shall be published in the other newspaper.

WE WILL convene during working time all employees at the Brooklyn plant, by shifts, departments, or otherwise, and have Beirel Jacobowitz read to the assembled employees the contents of this notice, or at Beirel Jacobowitz' option, permit a Board agent to read the notice. If Beirel Jacobowitz chooses to have a Board agent read the notice, he shall be present while the notice is read. In addition, he shall be present while the Spanish translation of the notice is read to assembled employees by a Board agent or by a Board provided interpreter. The Board shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to provide for the presence of a Board agent and an interpreter at any assembly called for the purpose of reading the notice.

WE WILL, on request of the ILG made within 1 year of the issuance of the Order here, make available to the ILG without delay a list of names and addresses of all employees at the time of the request.

WE WILL immediately on request of the ILG, for a period of 2 years from the date on which the notice is posted or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, grant the ILG and its representatives reasonable access the the Brooklyn, New York plant bulletin boards and all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.

WE WILL immediately on request of the ILG for a period of 2 years from the date on which the notice is posted or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, permit a reasonable number of union representatives access for reasonable periods of time to nonwork areas, including but not limited to canteens, cafeterias, rest areas, and parking lots, within our plant so that the ILG may present its views on unionization to our employees orally and in writing, in such areas during changes of shift, breaks, mealtimes, or other nonwork periods.

WE WILL in the event that during a period of 2 years following the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted, or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, any supervisor or agent of ours convenes any group of employees at the Brooklyn, New York plant and addresses them on the question of union representation, give the ILG reasonable notice thereof and afford two union representatives a reasonable opportunity to be present at such speech and, on request, give one of them equal time and facilities to address the employees on the question of union representation.

WE WILL in any election which the Board may schedule at the Brooklyn, New York plant within a period of 2 years following the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted and in which the ILG is a participant, permit, on request by the ILG at least two union representatives reasonable access to the plant and appropriate facilities to deliver a 30-minute speech to employees on working time, the date thereof to be not

more than 10 working days but not less than 48 hours prior to any such election.

THREE SISTERS SPORTSWEAR CO., BEDFORD CUTTING MILLS, INC., THREE SISTERS APPAREL CORP., METROPOLITAN SWEATER INDUSTRIES, INC., UNITED KNITWEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., UNITED KNITWEAR INDUSTRIES, LTD., SKYLIGHT FASHIONS, INC. D/B/A SKYLIGHT TRADING, AND 144 SPENCER REALTY CORP.

Elias Feuer, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Stuart Bochner, Esq. (Horowitz & Pollack, P.C.), of South Orange, New Jersey, for Respondent Employers.
Sol Bogen, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Respondent Union.
Thomas Kennedy, Esq. and *Arthur Schwartz, Esq. (Lewis, Greenwald, Kennedy, Lewis, Clifton & Schwartz, P.C.)*, of New York, New York, for the Charging Party.

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

STEVEN B. FISH, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to numerous charges filed in the above-entitled cases by International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO (the ILG, the Union, or Charging Party), the Regional Director is sued a number of complaints, including an order further consolidating cases, amended consolidated complaint and notice of hearing, issued on June 13, 1991, which alleges in substance that Three Sisters Sportswear Co. (Sportswear), Three Sisters Apparel Corp. (Apparel) (collectively Three Sisters), Bedford Cutting Mills Co. (Bedford), Metropolitan Sweater Industries, Inc. (Metro-Sweater), United Knitwear Industries, Inc. (United Inc.), United Knitwear Industries, Ltd. (United Ltd.) (collectively United), Skylight Fashions, Inc., d/b/a Skylight Trading (Skylight) (collectively Respondent Employers or Respondents) are a single-integrated business enterprise and have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threats, warnings, interrogations, promises of benefit, surveillance, creating the impression of surveillance, and physically removing an employee from the plant; Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by threatening and promising employees' benefits to induce them to support Local 17-18 United Production Workers' Union (Respondent Union or Local 17-18); offering to Local 17-18 to engage in surveillance of employees to learn the identity of ILG supporters and disclose said information to Local 17-18; and by circulating and urging employees to sign a petition in support of Local 17-18, and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging or laying off employees Rosita Chalston, Carmen Nieves, Bella Martinez, Nidia Rodriguez, and constructively discharging its employee Israel Galarza, because the employees supported and assisted the ILG; and Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act by issuing a disciplinary warning to and laying off and subjecting Chalston to closer supervision because she had been the subject of previous charges filed on her behalf. The complaint also alleges that Local 17-18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by in the presence of employees accepting the offer of Respondent Employers to engage in surveillance of employees concerning their union support and disclose the information to Local 17-18, thereby creating the impression of surveillance of their activities on behalf of the ILG.

During the course of the trial which was held over the course of 22 days between June 24, 1991, and February 25, 1992, the complaint was amended to include 144 Spencer Realty Corp. (Spencer) as an additional Respondent and as part of alleged single-integrated enterprise of Respondent Employers. Finally, on October 1, 1991, I granted General Counsel's motion to consolidate two additional cases, which complaints alleged additional discriminatory layoffs of Chalston plus an unlawful discharge of employee Silvia Silverio.

Briefs have been filed by General Counsel, Respondent Employer, and Charging Party. Respondent Union presented oral argument. Based on the entire record,[1] including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs and oral argument, I make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION

Each of the named Respondent Employers are New York corporations which are located at 144 Spencer Street, Brooklyn, New York. All but Spencer are engaged in some phase of the process of the manufacture, sale, and distribution of knitwear goods and related products. Spencer is a real estate corporation which owns and manages the facility at 144 Spencer Street, as well as several other buildings. Annually, Respondent Employers, in the course of their business, purchased and received at their Spencer Street facility knitwear goods and other goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of New York. Respondent Employers are, and have been at all times material, employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

Additionally, the ILG and Local 17-18 are and have been at all times material labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. PRIOR RELATED CASES SOUTHLAND KNITWEAR, INC. AND METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIES, INC. CASES 29–CA–7765, 29–CA–8096, 260 NLRB 642 (1982)

On March 4, 1982, the Board issued its decision in the above-entitled case, affirming the administrative law judge's recommendation that Southland Knitwear, Inc. (Southland) and Metropolitan Industries, Inc. (Metropolitan), a single-integrated enterprise, violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. The agents of the Respondent therein, who committed the various unfair labor practices were Jack Jacobowitz and three of his children Beirel, Leibish,[2] and Sylvia. The violations found included threats to employees of discharge and or plant closure if they supported ILG or if they refused to support Local 413, Office and Professional Employees

[1] While every apparent or nonapparent conflict in the evidence may not have been specifically resolved below, my findings are based on my examination of the entire record, my observation of the witnesses' demeanor while testifying, and my evaluation of the reliability of their testimony. Therefore, any testimony in the record which is inconsistent with my findings is discredited.

[2] Leibish shall be referred to by his legal name of David.

International Union, AFL–CIO (Local 413), interfering with the distribution of ILG literature, admonishing employees not to speak to ILG representatives, telling employees that the ILG representative was from the Mafia, soliciting and forcing employees to sign authorizaiton cards for Local 413, creating the impression of surveillance of employees, promising and granting employees benefits to induce them to support Local 413 and/or to abandon their support for ILG, the laying off of approximately 83 employees because of their support for ILG and their refusal to support Local 413, and conditioning the recall of employees on abandonment of ILG, and enforcing a long dormant collective-bargaining agreement with Local 413, including the deduction of dues from employees' paychecks. The Board also modified the administrative law judge's recommended Order to provide for a broad cease-and-desist Order, inasmuch as it found that the Respondent therein had committed ''egregious and widespread unfair labor practices.''

On May 5, 1983, Southland and Metropolitan, by its attorney, entered into a stipulation with the Board, waiving its rights to appeal the underlying decision, in exchange for the Board's refraining from seeking enforcement. The stipulation also reflects that the Respondents are not precluded from litigating the question of backpay due to the employees, and that Respondents will make records available to the Board necessary for the computation of backpay due.

Southland and Metropolitan purportedly shut down their operations at 144 Spencer Street in mid-September 1983. Apparently, at some point undisclosed by the record, the Region received information that these corporations may still be operating at that location, but under the names of the various Respondents in the instant case. Consequently, on June 13, 1989, the Region issued a backpay specification and notice of hearing in Cases 29–CA–7765 and 29–CA–8096, which alleged inter alia that all the named corporations in the instant case (except for Spencer) were since on or about October 1983, a single employer, alter ego with and/or successor to Southland and Metropolitan, and that all of these corporations were jointly and severally liable for making whole the discriminatees for the loss of the pay they suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. Subsequently, a number of amendments were issued to this specification, and the hearing therein opened before me on January 21, 1992. After much discussion, it was decided to defer litigation of the issue of whether the various operating entities were responsible for remedying the unfair labor practices of Southland and Metropolitan, until the record was complete in the instant case, when it would be decided what portions of this record would be incorporated into the record of the backpay hearing.

On March 13, 1992, the parties entered into a stipulation settling the backpay matter, which I subsequently approved. The stipulation provides that all of the named Respondents, including Spencer, would be jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the backpay owed by Southland and Metropolitan pursuant to the Board Order which would be satisfied by the payment of some $340,000 in installment payments between May 1992 and April 1, 1994. The stipulation also provided that the agreement does not constitute an admission that the corporations involved are a single employer or that they are alter egos and/or successors of or to each other and/or to Southland or Metropolitan.

III. THE SINGLE EMPLOYER ISSUE

A. *Facts*

The preliminary question to be decided is whether it is necessary or appropriate for me to make findings as to the single employer issue in the instant case. I had initially raised this issue myself particularly in view of the pendency at that time, of the backpay hearing wherein the identical issues would have to be litigated and decided. That possibility has now been eliminated, in view of the settlement of the other case, without a determination of the issues involved herein.

However, the issue is still present, especially since Respondents have taken the position that the single employer issue need not and should not be decided at this time. In that connection, Respondents contend that the employer of all the employees involved herein is Three Sisters,[3] and that there is no need to decide the question of the alleged relationship between Three Sisters and the other companies, unless and until it becomes necessary in a compliance proceeding.

General Counsel argues on the other hand that the administrative law judge must decide all complaint allegations. *Cardio Data Systems Corp*., 264 NLRB 37 (1982). General Counsel also argues that since an extensive record has been made in the present case, it is essential for a determination to be made on that record so that proper legal responsibility for Respondents actions can be enforced, with the possibility of contempt against all of the possible violators, in the event of future violations.

Charging Party emphasizes the ''egregious'' violations committed by Southland and Metropolitan in the prior case, and urges that a finding that the present entities are an alter ego of or single employer with these other corporations is essential to prevent future violations by Respondents, and to justify various special remedies requested by Charging Party in the current case.

I am persuaded that it is appropriate for me to decide the issue in this case. The matter has been litigated extensively, which included several instances of district court enforcement of subpoenas before Respondents turned over relevant documents. I do not believe that effectuation of the Act would be enhanced by postponing a decision on this issue, requiring the duplication of such litigation, in the event Respondents do not comply with the decision. Moreover, the connection between Southland and Metropolitan and the present companies must be decided in order to determine the propriety of the special remedies that Charging Party has requested.

Accordingly, I shall decide the issues of whether the Respondents herein constitute a single employer, as well as whether these Respondents constitute an alter ego of or single employer with Southland and Metropolitan.

In that connection, the prior decision found that Southland and Metropolitan were engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of knitwear goods and related products at 144 Spencer Street in Brooklyn. Prior to 1973, Southland and Metropolitan had operated under the name High Point Hosiery located at Park Avenue, Brooklyn.

[3] Respondent concedes that the two Three Sisters entities, Three Sisters Sportswear, and Three Sisters Apparel Corp., do constitute a single employer.

In 1973, the Company's name was changed from Highpoint to Southland and Metropolitan when it moved to the sixth floor on 144 Spencer Street. On August 13, 1973, an account was opened with Brooklyn Union Gas Co. for gas supplied to four heating units and a hot water heater, located at 144 Spencer Street. According to records from Brooklyn Union Gas, this account has been continuous from 1973 to date, and that at least from May 7 1984, the bill has been sent care of Bedford Cutting Mills. These records do not establish what floors are involved with this account. The Brooklyn Union Gas records also established a separate Brooklyn Union Gas account for Three Sisters, opened on October 9, 1984, which covers the fifth floor at 144 Spencer Street.

Although the prior case found the Respondents therein to be a single integrated enterprise consisting of Southland and Metropolitan Industries (Metro) it appears that the Respondent therein was also operating under the names of Metropolitan Form Industries (Form), and Metropolitan Sweater Industries (Metro-Sweater). Collectively, I shall refer to the entire entity as Southland-Metro.

Thus, Southland opened a payroll checking account at Merchant's bank, with Jack and David Jacobowitz as signatories. The signature card discloses that Southland was introduced to the bank by Form. Form filed the Federal Quarterly wage report on behalf of Metro's employees, and Form and Metro have identical taxpayer ID numbers of Case 11–23–01746.

On June 13, 1978, the title of a checking account with the Merchants Bank was changed to Metro Sweater, with Jack and David Jacobowitz again signatories, as president and treasurer.[4] In 1979, the employees were issued W-2 forms by Metro, but in 1981 and 1982, the same employees were issued W-2 forms by Southland and Metro-Sweater respectively, both of which shared a common ID number of 11–25533373.

Employee Ausemzia Lugo was hired at 144 Spencer Street on the sixth floor, in June 1979 (under her maiden name, Francasca Agular), and during her tenure, which lasted until 1991 (with a maternity leave included), she was paid by either Southland or Metropolitan[5] at various times. Her uncontradicted and credited testimony established that prior to September 1983, Beirel Jacobowiz was the direct supervisor of the machine operators of the Southland-Metro entity, who worked on the sixth floor at 144 Spencer Street. During that same period of time, the cutting department was also on the sixth floor, and was supervised by David Jacobowitz.

As noted above, in May 1983, Respondent Southland Metro entered into a stipulation, waiving its rights to appeal the underlying decision by the Board, and leaving for future determination the question of backpay due to the 83 employees discriminated against.

In mid-September 1983, Beirel met with the sewing machine operators of Southland Metro and notified them that they would be moving to the fifth floor in 2 weeks. The employees were instructed by Beirel to paste labels on their machines with their names on it.

Two weeks later, on October 2, 1982, 51 former Southland Metro employees, including Lugo reported for work on the fifth floor, where Beirel directed these employees to use the same machines that they had labeled with their names and operated previously on the sixth floor. As of October 2, these employees were placed on the payroll of Three Sisters.

Three Sisters had formerly been located on 84 North 9th Street, Brooklyn, and had moved to 144 Spencer Street in late May or early June 1983. Three Sisters' payroll ending September 25, 1983, consisted of 34 employees. Its payroll for the week ending October 9, 1983, consisted of 94 employees, including 50 former Southland-Metro employees who were listed by Three Sisters as new hires, along with 12 other employees listed as new hires, who had not previously been employed by either Southland-Metro or Three Sisters.

The cutting department employees remained on the sixth floor, and continued to be supervised by David Jacobowitz. At some point, undisclosed by the record, the cutting department employees were transferred to the payroll of Bedford Cutting Mills, Inc. (Bedford). At other points, also not disclosed by the record, the cutting department employees employed by Bedford moved to the fourth floor at 144 Spencer Street, and subsequently were transferred from Bedford's payroll to the payroll of Three Sisters. All the corporate offices of Bedford were held by Abraham Gutman, who is Jack Jacobowitz' son-in-law and who is married to Jack's daughter Sylvia. However, the evidence discloses that the cutting department employees have been supervised by David Jacobowitz directly, under the overall supervision of Beirel. While Gutman as noted is the only corporate officer listed, there is no evidence that he played any active role in the running of the business.

As for Three Sisters, when it commenced operations, its only officers were Jonathan and Eva Mandel, who were not related to the Jacobowitzes. However, it is clear that Beirel continued to run the operation on a day-to-day basis, even after the transfer of employees to the Three Sisters payroll. Jonathan Mandel was involved in supervising employees for a period of several months, until early in 1984, when he disappeared from any active role in the business. The Mandels signed Three Sisters' tax returns for 1982, and received salaries of $12,000 for Jonathan and $3200 for Eva that year. The 1983 tax return provided for no salary to either Mandel, notwithstanding the fact that its gross income rose from $400,000 to $1,319,728. In their 1984, 1985, and 1986 returns, Three Sisters did not show any salary to the Mandels or to any other officer. At some point, not disclosed by the record, but prior to 1986, Martin Weingarten, and his wife Leah, a daughter of Jack Jacobowitz, became officers of Three Sisters. However, once again the record does not disclose any evidence that either Weingarten played any direct role in running the business.

In January 1984, a document was executed at Three Sisters' bank listing Jonathan Mandel and Abraham Jacobowitz as president and secretary of Three Sisters, and as the two individuals with authority to sign checks on behalf of Three Sisters. Abraham Jacobowitz is a son of Jack and a brother of Beirel, who has been at all times material herein a full-time student studying at Yeshiva, and who has never actually

[4] This checking account was maintained until at least January 31, 1985. Additionally, Metro Sweater filed a document dated October 14, 1983, with the Merchants Bank, indicating that any one officer of the corporation was authorized to sign or endorse checks, and that Jack or David Jacobowitz were the officers so designated.

[5] She did not indicate which Metropolitan entity paid her, although her 1982 W-2 form was issued by Metro Sweaters.

performed any work for Three Sisters or any other of Respondents' corporations. However, at the instruction of his father Jack, Abraham gave his brother Beirel the authority to sign his (Abraham's) name on any documents involved in the various companies controlled by the Jacobowitzes.

Jack Jacobowitz consistently attempted to disclaim any knowledge of a connection between Three Sisters and the other entities involved, and sought to portray Beirel's employment there as a mere coincidence. I found Jack Jacobowitz who testified as a 611(C) witness and in connection with the question of the existence of certain records, not to be believable. He responded to most questions, ''I don't know,'' or ''I do not remember,'' and I am convinced that he was able to answer many of these questions, but he simply chose not to do so. Thus, I have not credited him in various respects, where his testimony conflicts with other findings that I have made below.[6]

However, I do rely on the following testimony of Jacobowitz as an admission against the various Jacobowitz entities. Thus, Jack Jacobowitz was asked when he first found out that his son Beirel was going to be working at Three Sisters? His response was as follows:

> I don't know when I found out. You have to ask him. I have no idea when. Probably, he came around asking, I gave him a job. I said yes, I gave him a job. He's entitled to make a living.

Later on in his examination, Jack Jacobowitz repeated this revealing admission when he testified referring to Beirel, ''but he asked me, I want the job, so I gave him the job.''

At approximately the same time that Three Sisters hired the Southland-Metro employees, Jack Jacobowitz formed several additional corporations which operated out of the same 144 Spencer Street location. They were United Knitwear Industries, Ltd. (Ltd.), and United Knitwear Industries, Inc. (Inc.) (United),[7] and Skylight Fashions, Inc. (Skylight). Jack Jacobowitz owns 51 percent of each of these corporations, with his sons Beirel and David owning 24.5 percent of said companies, which are subchapter (S) corporations.

United became the coordinating arm of the operation. Thus, purchasing was done by United, cutting by Bedford, the sewing, cleaning, hanging, packaging, and shipping by Three Sisters, sales and collections by United and by Skylight. Thus the record discloses that the various Jacobowitz entitles occupied floors 4, 5, and 6 at 144 Spencer Street. The building has two large signs on the outside, which refer only to Skylight of all the Respondents. The testimony of employee Israel Galarza supported by the testimony of employee Brigida Padilla, as well as various documents submitted into evidence, established significant functional integration between the companies. Thus, when fabric is delivered to 144 Spencer Street, it is loaded on the elevator by employees normally employed and paid by Bedford on the fourth floor.[8] These employees take the fabric to the sixth floor, where it is stored. The sixth floor also was used to store spare parts, old sewing machines, and corporate records. These Bedford employees retrieve the fabric from the sixth floor and transport it to the fourth floor, where it is cut at the cutting tables by Bedford employees. After the fabric is cut, it is placed into bundles and sorted by colors, at other tables on the fourth floor by employees of Bedford and at times assisted by employees of Three Sisters.[9]

The bundled fabrics are then transported to the fifth floor by the Bedford employees, wherein they would be distributed to the merrow and singer sewing machine operators employed by Three Sisters who produce a finished garment. Next, floor workers employed by Three Sisters cut the threads, clean, ticket, place the garments on hangers and in plastic bags, and send the garments by a conveyor pipe to the fourth floor, where they are packed and shipped.[10]

The entire operation is overseen by Beirel who moves from floor to floor, and supervises employees on all three floors. Beirel utilizes a loudspeaker system and a walkie-talkie to communicate announcements to employees and/or orders or requests to supervisors from floor to floor. David Jacobowitz continued to be the direct supervisor of the cutting department employees, as he had been at Southland Metro.

Galarza's uncontradicted and credited testimony also establishes a significant admission on the part of Respondents. In October 1984, Galarza, who would at times bring the mail to Respondents from downstairs to the fifth floor, noticed mail addressed to United. Galarza asked Beirel about United since he was not familiar with that name. Beirel instructed Galarza that when he sees mail for United, ''it's for us.'' Beirel added that ''United is the same thing as Three Sisters.'' Beirel also told Galarza that Metropolitan Industries, Inc. was ''another of the names that the company had.''

I also conclude in agreement with General Counsel that the title of the sewing machines, previously owned by Southland Metro was acquired by United. I make this finding based on an examination of the depreciable assets of Southland Metro, United, and Three Sisters. In this connection, I do not credit the contradictory testimony of Jack Jacobowitz that the machinery was sold directly to Three Sisters by his sons on behalf of Southland Metro, or David Jacobowitz that the machines were sold at an auction. I note particularly the absence of any documentation to support either of these assertions, as well as the fact that the testimony of the two principals of Respondents conflict with each other on this point.

Additionally, some companies from whom United and/or Skylight purchased goods in 1984 and 1985, continued to use the old Order Acknowledgment Forms that had been used in connection with their prior purchases from Southland-Metro, more precisely from Metropolitan Industries, Inc. The invoices involved generally reflected that the goods were sold to United and shipped to Skylight, with the order acknowledgment from Metropolitan Industries. On these forms,

[6] For example, as discussed below, I do not credit Jacobowitz that equipment was sold to Three Sisters by Southland-Metro.

[7] Respondent concedes that Inc. and Ltd. are a single-integrated enterprise.

[8] Note however, that as detailed above, the Bedford employees at one point were transferred to the payroll of Three Sisters.

[9] These Three Sisters employees normally worked on the fifth floor for Three Sisters, but on occasion were told by their manager to help out on the fourth floor.

[10] It is not clear whether the employees who perform the packing and shipping functions on the fourth floor were employed by Bedford at one time, or by Three Sisters all along. As noted above, at some point all the employees were transferred to the Three Sisters payroll.

United Knitwear, Inc. at the 144 Spencer Street address was added to the Metropolitan form with the designation ''New Address.''

More importantly, the record is replete with evidence that United made payments to vendors on behalf of Three Sisters, Bedford, and/or Skylight for various supplies, services, and labor, including newspaper ads, leasing of sewing machines, purchase of a bagging machine, hangars, knives, garments, and other materials. Respondents adduced no evidence or explanation as to why United made these purchases.

Alan Feinsilber is utilized as the accountant for all the corporations involved, and he prepares the tax returns for these entities. The record reveals that he was paid with a United check for services rendered to Bedford and Three Sisters, as well as to United. Feinsilber addresses correspondence to United at 144 Spencer Street, even where the matters discussed in the letter relates to Three Sisters, Skylight, or Bedford.

There is one office area on the fifth floor at 144 Spencer Street for all the corporations, which includes the offices of Beirel, David, and Jack, as well as the clerical and bookkeeping staff of each company.[11]

The letterheads of both Skylight and United describe themselves identically as ''manufacturers of Ladies and Children's Quality Knitwear.'' During 1990, one vendor, New York Sewing Machine Attachment Co., invoiced United and Skylight interchangeably for the same items. Similarly, an audit letter from Feinsilber that was mailed to Burlington Industries to verify Skylight's accounts receivables had United Knitwear written on the top, and was returned by Burlington with an invoice summary of quarterly sales to United. It was also common practice for banks, customers, and other creditors of United and Skylight to require these companies to execute cross-corporate guarantees before loaning funds or extending credit to either of these companies. The record reveals that Jack Jacobowitz on behalf of both companies has executed such cross-corporate guarantees. Additionally Feinsilber admitted and the record discloses that he considered United and Skylight to be affiliates under IRS rules, and reports transactions between these companies as ''related parties transactions.'' For the years 1989 and 1990, 100 percent of United's sales were made to Skylight.[12] For the year ending June 30, 1990, Skylight paid 68.4 percent of its contractor expenses to United. During the fiscal year ending March 31, 1990, Three Sisters and Bedford comprised 57.6 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively, of United's contractor expenses for that year. For the last year in which Bedford filed a tax return, ending October 31, 1986, 98 percent of Bedford's sales were made to United and Skylight. Bedford does 100 percent of United's cutting.

Significant and substantial evidence of a connection between the corporations was demonstrated by a number of documents relating to insurance policies and coverage. Thus, on June 19, 1987, David Jacobowitz signed a document from MSP Insurance Trust (MSP) involving an insurance claim of an employee, which indicates that the employee is actively working full time for ''Bedford, Three Sisters, United.'' The document also reflects, under David Jacobowitz' signature that ''these three companies (Bedford, Three Sisters, and United) are interrelated, located on the same premises, and have the same officers.''

Prior to April 1987, monthly invoices from MSP covering insurance for David, Beirel, and Jack Jacobowitz were addressed to Metro Sweater and paid by checks from United. As of April 1, 1987, invoices with the same MSP billing account number covering the same employees were then addressed to United, Bedford, Three Sisters, and were still paid by United. In the fall of 1989, and Three Sisters and United were jointly invoiced for a Blue Shield-Blue Cross policy covering the Jacobowitz plus the other clerical employeeses and a disability policy covering David Jacobowitz, which were both paid by United checks.

In July 1988, United was contacted by the New York State Workers' Compensation Board requesting proof that its employees were covered by a compensation policy. United replied, enclosing a binder from PSM Insurance Co., reflecting insurance coverage for United and/or Bedford and/or Skylight and/or Spencer Bruce Ltd. at 144 Spencer Street, listing the business as ''Sportswear Mfg.''

On January 3, 1989, United was sent a notice from the State Insurance Fund, indicating that the policy for all the companies has been canceled ''at your request.'' United responded by letter dated January 10, 1989, stating that it did not want to cancel the policy, but only to eliminate Skylite, Spencer Bruce, or Bedford, and continue the policy only for employees of Three Sisters and United.

On March 23, 1989, a commercial insurance policy was issued by North River Insurance Co. covering United, Three Sisters, Skylight, Bedford, Spencer Bruce, and Spencer Realty Co. Subsequently, Royal Insurance Co. of America became the insurer with a policy from 1991–1992 covering all the above companies with the exception of Spencer Bruce.

Finally, it appears that the employees of Bedford (when Bedford had employees) and those employees employed by Three Sisters were covered by the same collective-bargaining agreement with Local 17-18, United, Production Workers' Union, AFL–CIO.

As for 144 Spencer Realty Co. (Spencer), this entity on September 9, 1982, purchased the building at 144 Spencer Street, Brooklyn, New York, which also included addresses of 132 and 164 Spencer Street and 700 Myrtle Avenue. Jack Jacobowitz is the majority shareholder of Spencer, with his son Abraham also holding a small amount of shares in the company. Spencer's current checking account was opened at Mfg. Hanover Trust, on September 16, 1982, with the taxpaper ID number of 11–2553373 the same as used by Southland and Metro Sweater. The signatories on the account were David or Abraham Jacobowitz.

As noted above, Abraham Jacobowitz authorized his brother Beirel to sign his name, which authority Beirel utilized with respect to Spencer as with other of the entities involved. In fact, Beirel and David Jacobowitz shared the day-to-day running of Spencer, along with their similar responsibilities with respect to Three Sisters and Bedford. In this connection, Beirel received legal documents and correspondences on behalf of Spencer addressed to him and signed checks and leases on behalf of Spencer under his alias ''Abraham'' Jacobowitz.

[11] All the companies used in addition to employees, Barbara Blatt, an independent contractor to perform bookkeeping services for them.

[12] For 1984, 97.5 percent of Three Sisters' income came from United.

Spencer shares office space and clerical employees with the other companies herein on the fifth floor at 144 Spencer Street. Additionally, Spencer also uses Feinsilber as its accountant.

Since no leases between Spencer and Southland Metro, Three Sisters, Bedford, United, or Skylight were produced pursuant to subpoena, I agree with General Counsel that it is appropriate to infer, which I shall do, that no such leases were executed between these parties.[13]

When Spencer purchased the building in September of 1982, Southland-Metro was located on the sixth floor, and paid rent to Spencer through September 1983. Southland-Metro's rent payments would fluctuate and, in some months, it made no payments at all. From January through June 1983, its rent payments to Spencer ranged from $3500 to $4500 per month. In July 1983, it made no payments, but in August Southland-Metro made two $2500 payments. Bedford began making rent payments in July 1983 of $1500. In September, Southland-Metro's last month of paying rent, it paid $2500 and Bedford $1500.

Three Sisters began paying rent in June 1983 at a rate of $2,187.50 per month. In October when Southland Metro ceased paying rent, Three Sisters' rent was increased by $1,458.33 to $3,645.83. Bedford paid no rent for October 1983. In November 1983, United paid the rent for Three Sisters of $3,645.83, while again Bedford paid no rent. Bedford paid $1500 for rent in December 1983, while Three Sisters made no payments.

In January 1984, Bedford's rent was increased to $2500 and paid such rent for January, February, and March. Three Sisters paid its rent of $3,645.28 during these months. However, during April and May 1984, neither Three Sisters nor Bedford paid any rent. Bedford missed payments in July 1984 and January 1985. There is no evidence that any of the above-detailed rent delinquencies of Three Sisters and Bedford were ever satisfied. However, United made a loan to Spencer of $5000 in March 1984, $12,500 in May 1984, and $3000 in May 1985. No evidence was adduced that Spencer ever repaid any of these loans.

Three Sisters and Bedford continued to regularly pay $3,645.83 and $2,500 respectively until October 1987, when the monthly payments were suddenly reduced to $1000 and $500 respectively. Spencer's rent receipts do not reflect that any other tenants received any reductions in rent at that or any other time for that matter. Nor did Respondents adduce any evidence to explain the substantial rent reductions in October 1987 for these companies. These reduced payments continued through at least January 1989. In February 1989, neither Bedford nor Three Sisters paid any rent. The check ledgers of Three Sisters show that it continued to pay $1000 a month to Spencer at least through July 1990. However, on its checkstubs, Three Sisters labeled its payments to Spencer during the months of May, June, July, and August 1987 as LIE (loans and exchanges) or simply loan, instead of as rent.

Finally, the record reflects that in response to the General Counsel's subpoena for records of Spencer Realty Co., Respondent produced files that included documents relating to Bedford, Three Sisters, United, and Skylight, along with documents relating to Spencer. No explanation was adduced by Respondents to explain this commingling of files.

[13] I note further that Respondent adduced no evidence that such leases were ever in existence.

B. *Analysis*

In determining whether separate entities constitute a single employer, the Board considers factors such as interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control. *Hydrolines, Inc*., 305 NLRB 416 (1991). Also relevant are such factors as the use of common office facilities, common use of equipment, and family connections between or among the various enterprises. *Goodman Investment Co*., 292 NLRB 340, 347 (1989). Not all of these factors must be found to establish the existence of a single employer, and no one factor is controlling. Single employer status depends on all the circumstances of a particular case, and is characterized by an absence of an arm's-length relationship found among unintegrated companies. *Hydrolines*, supra; *Goodman*, supra; *NLRB v. Al Bryant*, 711 F.2d 543, 55 (3d Cir. 1983).

The question of whether companies constitute alter egos of each other, involves the examination of similar criteria, plus an examination of the purpose of the formation of the additional companies. Thus, among the factors to be considered are common management, ownership, common business purpose, the nature of operations, and supervision, common customers, i.e., whether the employers constitute ''the same business in the same market,'' as well as the nature and extent of the negotiations and formalities surrounding the transaction; and whether the purpose behind the creation of the alleged alter ego was legitimate or whether instead its purpose was to evade responsibilities under the Act. *Vinisa II, Ltd*., 308 NLRB 135 (1992); *Fugazy Continental Corp*., 265 NLRB 130 (1982), enfd. 725 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Although the complaint does not allege Southland-Metro to be a Respondent, as noted the alleged connection between the Respondents and Southland-Metro was litigated extensively as bearing on the issue of how and why the Respondents came to operate at 144 Spencer Street. It is therefore appropriate to decide whether the Respondents do constitute alter egos of the Southland-Metro entity, in assessing whether Respondents are single employers and/or alter egos of each other, as well as in considering the extraordinary remedies requested by Charging Party.

As noted above, Southland-Metro was found in the prior trial to have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, including the unlawful termination of 83 employees.[14] In May 1983, Southland-Metro executed a stipulation, wherein it withdrew its challenge to court enforcement of the Board Order. Clearly, Southland-Metro and its principals, the Jacobowitz family, knew that the entity was facing a substantial backpay liability to 83 employees as a result of its agreement not to contest the Board's Order.

Some 4 months later in mid-September, Southland-Metro purportedly shut down its operation at 144 Spencer Street. However, 2 weeks later, I conclude that Southland-Metro reopened its operation after acquiring Three Sisters, and form-

[14] Although only one of the Three Metropolitan entities (Industries) was referrred to in the prior decision, I have found above that the single employer enterprise also included Metro Sweater and Metro Form, and the enterprise treated these companies interchangeably. Indeed, the employees at times were paid by Metro Sweater.

ing the other corporations and continued their business of manufacturing and selling sweaters. Thus, a majority of Three Sisters' employees on October 2 consisted of former Southland-Metro employees, who were assigned by Beirel to work for Three Sisters on the fifth floor at 144 Spencer Street to operate the same sewing machines that they had used 2 weeks before, while working for Southland-Metro on the sixth floor.

As of October 2, 1983, these employees continued to be supervised by Beirel Jacobowitz. The cutters continued to be supervised by David Jacobowitz. Although the Mandels were the initial owners of Three Sisters, they received a salary for only 1 year, and disappeared from any active role in management of the Company after 4 months. Eventually, Martin Weingarten, a son-in-law of Jack Jacobowitz and brother-in-law of Beirel and David, became the owner of Three Sisters, although it does not appear that he plays any active role in the day-to-day operations of the business. I find these events to be nothing more than an obvious attempt to insulate Three Sisters from liability for Southland-Metro's unfair labor practices, while attempting to conceal the true facts, that Three Sisters and the other corporations are simply a continuation of the Southland-Metro business operations.

Respondents' attempt to portray Three Sisters as a separate independent corporation that happened to give jobs to Beirel and David is belied by the record. I note particularly that shortly after commencing its operations, Three Sisters gave check-signing authority to Beirel, through his alias Abraham Jacobowitz. This not only demonstrates significant evidence of control of Three Sisters at that time by the Jacobowitzes, but is revealing as further evidencing its intent to conceal the Company's connections with Southland-Metro. Thus, no explanation was given as to why Beirel could not have been given check-signing authority in his own name, rather than having him sign his brother's name, who was off studying at Yeshiva. I find the only logical assumption to be that since Beirel had been associated with Southland-Metro, it would not be advisable to have his name on record as a check signer of Three Sisters, which might reveal the fact that Beirel was continuing to run the business, as he had done while Southland-Metro was employing the employees.

It is noteworthy that Respondents have given no credible explanation for their decision to shut down their operation in September 1983, and reopen 2 weeks later. Respondents did not present any witness on their behalf. While at one point Jack Jacobowitz, who testified in connection with subpoenaed documents, and as a 611(c) witness, testified that Southland-Metro shut down ''because it had no business,'' this assertion was not proved by any documentary evidence, and was in fact refuted by the subsequent events of the reopening and the continuation of operations. Jacobowitz attempted to explain this decision by pointing out that as a ''jobber,'' his assertion as to United's function, he had no rent or overhead, and therefore his business was now substantially different. However, as detailed above and below, it is clear that United became more than a mere ''jobber,'' but was in fact the coordinating arm of the business, using Three Sisters to sew and Bedford to cut, and then using Skylight to sell the product to customers. Thus, it is obvious that the entity continues to have overhead and rent expenses, and Jacobowitz' assertion of no business as a reason for the purported shutdown is specious.

Also highly significant is Jack Jacobowitz' admission concerning the hiring of his son Beirel as an ''employee'' of Three Sisters. I note again my assessment of Jacobowitz' credibility as detailed above, wherein I concluded that he was falsely asserting that he did not remember in response to many questions, which were in my view an attempt to conceal true facts concerning the relationship between the various companies. Therefore, his admission that he (emphasis supplied) gave Beirel a job with Three Sisters, because Beirel was ''entitled to make a living,'' becomes even more significant in establishing that in fact the Jacobowitz family was in full control of the operations of Three Sisters as of October 2, 1983, when the former Southland Metro employees began their employment with that company.

Another significant factor, frequently relied on by the Board in finding alter ego status, is the presence of unlawful threats to close the plant by the Company which purportedly went out of business.[15] Here, the prior case did find a number of threats by Jack, David, and Beirel Jacobowitz to close the plant if the employees supported the ILG, which is further demonstrative of my conclusion that Southland-Metro carried out its threat to close,[16] but then reopened again under the new corporate names in order to avoid their responsibilities under the Act.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing evidence, including the admissions and statements of its officials, the timing and manner and short duration of the alleged shutdown of *Southeastern Envelope Co.*, 246 NLRB 423, 427 (1979), and the absence of any bona fide reasons for these actions, *BMD*, supra fn. 1, I conclude that Southland-Metro was motivated by the desire to avoid their backpay liability under the prior Board Order and that Three Sisters and the other entities are an alter ego of Southland-Metro.[17] *Fugazy*, supra; *Vinisa*, supra; *BMD*, supra; *Imco-International*, 304 NLRB 734 (1991).

Turning to the various factors considered by the Board in determining single employer and/or alter ego status, I find that most of them are present in varying degrees with respect to the companies in question.

As for interrelation of operations, the evidence is overwhelming that Three Sisters, Bedford, United, and Skylight are all involved in an integrated process of producing and selling garments. Thus, the unrefuted testimony of Galarza, as outlined above, traces the flow of the product from the receipt and storage of the fabric, cutting, sewing, packing, shipping, and sale of the garment, among the three floors at 144 Spencer Street, inhabited by these companies.

All four of these corporations share the same office area, clerical staff and accounting services. *Goodman*, supra at 347; *Imco*, supra.

Three Sisters and Bedford sell almost 100 percent of their services to United and Skylight. United sells 100 percent of its services to Skylight. Bedford does all of United's cutting. *Hydrolines*, supra.

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[15] *Fugazy*, supra at 1303; *BMD Sportswear Co.*, 283 NLRB 142, 155 (1987), *Vulcan Trailer Mfg.*, 283 NLRB 480, 486 (1987).

[16] Even more revealing is Beirel's statement to an employee that Southland-Metro had many other places where it could send the work, if it closed. See *BMD*, supra fn. 1 at 142.

[17] I shall detail below more specific findings with respect to the single employer status of these corporations, which also deal with similar criteria vis a vis the alter ego questions.

United coordinates the production by making purchases on behalf of Bedford, Three Sisters, and Skylight, paying for accounting services for these companies, and paying for various joint insurance policies which cover all of these entities. Additionally, at times, United has paid rent on behalf of Three Sisters.

Moreover, Beirel Jacobowitz admitted to employee Galarza that Three Sisters and United were the ''same thing,'' as well as the fact that Metropolitan Industries was ''another of the names that the company had.'' *NLRB v. Edwin R. O'Neill*, 140 LRRM 2557, 2563 (9th Cir. 1992). In this connection, it is also noteworthy that David Jacobowitz signed an insurance document stating that Bedford, Three Sisters, and United ''are interrelated, located on the same premises and have the same officers,'' and that the accountant for all of these corporations designated United and Skylight as affiliates, to designate related party transactions under IRS rules.

Additionally, United and Skylight use the same computer, and have been invoiced interchangeably by various vendors. It was required by creditors of United and Skylight to execute cross-corporate guarantees before loaning funds to these companies, which requirements have been complied with by these corporations.

So, in sum, these companies all serve the Jacobowitz family business of producing and selling garments. *Imco*, supra. They manufacture the product in an integrated fashion, with United, Bedford, and Three Sisters as the manufacturing and production arm and Skylight as the selling arm of the family business. See *Palby Lingerie*, 252 NLRB 176, 178 (1988).

Common management and ownership is clear, and is distributed among various members of the Jacobowitz family, including two sons-in-law. Indeed, Respondent concedes in its brief that all the companies are ''owned by the Jacobowitz family.''

Although the ownership and management of each Company may not be identical, where they all include members of the same family, the requirement of common ownership and management is met. *Vinisa*, supra; *Crawford Door Sales Co.*, 226 NLRB 1144 (1976).

Respondents argue most strenuously that no evidence was presented that any of the companies are involved in a common labor relations policy, and that the absence of such a finding is fatal to a single employer or alter ego determination. In this connection, Respondent correctly notes that United and Skylight have no unit employees.

However, although the Board has frequently stressed the importance of centralized control of labor relations in determining single employer status, *Hydrolines*, supra, this factor becomes less important where some of the companies have no employees. *Imco*, supra; see also *Goodman*, supra. Here there is evidence of centralized control over labor relations of the employees of Three Sisters and Bedford, when Bedford had employees. Thus, communications are made by Beirel and David Jacobowitz to employees and supervisors by loudspeaker and walkie-talkies from the centralized fifth floor office to the other two floors and to employees employed by Three Sisters and Bedford. Additionally, Beirel travels through the fourth, fifth, and sixth floor giving orders and directions to employees employed by both of the corporations working on any of those floors. Moreover, the employees of Bedford and Three Sisters were covered (when Bedford had employees), by the identical collective-bargaining agreement with Local 17-18. Of course, currently and approximately since 1989, Bedford has no employees, and all the employees are now on the Three Sisters payroll, and obviously share a common labor policy. Thus, as to Bedford and Three Sisters, the common labor relations criteria is satisfied. Because all the other pertinent single employer criteria are met with respect to Skylight and United, and because there is no arm's-length relationship among them, a single employer finding is warranted, *Imco*, supra; *BMD*, supra; *Hydrolines*, supra. I so find.

I would also conclude that an alter ego finding as between these companies is also appropriate, since the criteria in *Fugazy*, supra, has been met. There is common management and ownership; common business purpose; common operation, premises and supervision; and common customers, i.e., the employers constitute the same business in the same market. Moreover, I have concluded the purpose behind these entities operating at 144 Spencer Street was to avoid the backpay obligations of Southland-Metro. Thus, I conclude that United, Skylight, Bedford, and Three Sisters are single employers and alter egos of each other, as well as alter egos of Southland-Metro, *Imco*, supra; *BMD*, supra.

The complaint also alleges that Metro-Sweater is part of the single-integrated enterprise and should be found to be a Respondent in the instant case. General Counsel argues that since Metro-Sweater maintained a bank account until 1987, and its forms were used by United to purchase goods until 1985, and there is no evidence that the Company is defunct, Metro-South must be considered to be a part of the single-integrated enterprise.

However, I need not decide the question of whether Metro-Sweater is defunct, or is still in existence. Inasmuch as I have already concluded that Metro-Sweater was part of the Southland-Metro integrated enterprise, and that the current United, Three Sisters, Bedford, and Skylight integrated enterprise is an alter ego of the Southland-Metro entity, it is appropriate to include Metro-Sweater as a Respondent herein and as part of the single employer responsible for the unfair labor practices that I find below. I note particularly in this regard, that the Order in the prior case did not include Metro-Sweater, so it is essential to include that entity as a Respondent in the event the Jacobowitz family decides to resurrect that Company and operated under that name once again.

Turning to 144 Spencer Street Realty Corp. (Spencer), the complaint, as amended, alleges and General Counsel contends that a single employer relationship also exists between Spencer and the other entities involved. Respondent urges that since Spencer is involved in real estate ownership and management, a business ''totally and completely'' removed from that of the other companies, a single employer relationship cannot be found. I do not agree. Notwithstanding the different business purposes between real estate companies and other types of businesses, a single employer relationship can be found particularly where there is evidence of a lack of an arm's-length relationship between the entities. *G. Zaffino & Sons, Inc.*, 289 NLRB 571, 577 (1988), *Fullerton Transfer & Storage*, 291 NLRB 426 (1988), *Capitol Theatre*, 231 NLRB 1370, 1374–1375 (1977). Here, the evidence supporting the lack of an arm's-length relationship between the parties is substantial.

Spencer shares office space, clerical employees, and accounting services with the other companies. *Capital*, supra at 1375. Spencer had the identical taxpayer ID number as Metro-Sweater. *Precision Carpet*, 223 NLRB 329, 338 (1976). Spencer is managed and owned by various members of the Jacobowitz family, as is the other corporate entities. *Zaffino*, supra; *Fullerton*, supra. Most importantly, Spencer never obtained any leases from any of the Jacobowitz-dominated companies, while requiring leases from other tenants in the building. Additionally, United and Skylight paid no rent to Spencer, except for the times when United paid rent on behalf of Three Sisters. Also, there were several months when Three Sisters and Bedford never paid rent, and these delinquencies were never satisfied. United made loans of over $20,500 to Spencer which were not repaid. Most significant of all is the sudden unexplained reductions in rent for Bedford and Three Sisters in October 1987 of 80 and 74 percent respectively. *Zaffino*, supra; *Fullerton*, supra. Finally, the record reveals the commingling of records in the files of Spencer with those of the other companies.

Based on the foregoing, I conclude that there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the dealings between Spencer and the other companies cannot be characterized as being at arm's-length; *Zaffino*, supra. Accordingly, I find that Spencer, is also part of the single-integrated enterprise with and is an alter ego of the other corporations described above; *Zaffino*, supra; *Fullerton*, supra; *Capitol*, supra.

IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. *Background*

As noted above, the prior case revealed extensive animus towards the employees because of their efforts to support the ILG. Employee Francisca Aguilar was one of the discriminatees in the prior case. Her sister Auzencia Lugo, as detailed above, worked for Southland-Metro and then at Three Sisters. In 1985, Lugo asked Beirel if she would rehire her sister, Francisca Aguilar. Beirel informed Lugo to bring her sister, but to tell her ''not to cause any problems.''

When Aguilar went to Respondents' facility, she spoke to Beirel about a job. Beirel told her that he didn't want any more problems and warned her not to get in trouble with the Union. He added that there was already a good union in and he didn't want her to look for another union. Beirel continued that Local 17-18 is the Union in, and is a good union and is the union that he wanted.

About 3 weeks after she was rehired, Beirel asked her to distribute some flyers for Local 17-18 during worktime. Beirel also gave her $50 to distribute the flyers and $100 to tell employees that Local 17-18 was a good union and the employees would always have jobs, and that the other union, the ILG was also bringing problems.

B. *Supervisory or Agency Status*

As noted above, Beirel and David Jacobowitz are the chief operating officials of the Respondents, who hire and fire and make most managerial decisions. There can be little dispute that they are supervisors and agents of Respondents and I so find.

Pablo is the plant manager who reports directly to Beirel and David. He oversees the operation of 130–150 employees, consisting of three sections of merrow machine operators, and one section of singer machine operators. Pablo responsibly distributes the work to section supervisors who in turn assign work directly to the employees. Pablo also instructs the section supervisors to move employees from one job to another or occasionally will make such assignment himself. He also makes sure that Respondents' work rules are complied with, makes announcements over the loudspeaker on behalf of Respondents, and has the authority to grant time off to employees. Based on the foregoing, I find that Pablo is a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act, *BMD Sportswear*, 283 NLRB 142, 146–147 (1987), or at the very least has been placed in a position by Respondents that employees consider him to be their agent. *Community Cash Stores*, 238 NLRB 265 (1978).

Gary is in charge of supervising 125 floorworkers. He has signed disciplinary warnings and fired employee Rosita Chalston. He is clearly a supervisor and agent of Respondents and I so find.

A more difficult question arises with respect to the section supervisors, Vicky, Faith a/k/a Faye, Lipo Diamond, and Sarah Stern.[18] These individuals have the title of supervisor and are in charge of the direct assignment of work to from 20–35 employees in the various sections of Respondents' facility operating either the merrow or the singer sewing machines. These individuals also review the quality of the work performed by these employees, and can require the work to be redone if necessary. The record also establishes that Vicky evaluated and hired employee Silvia Silverio without consultation with any other management official.

Since the possession of any one of the functions enumerated in Section 2(11) of the Act is sufficient to establish 2(11) status, I conclude that Vicky's authority to hire employees on behalf of Respondents, with the exercise of independent judgment, warrants a finding that she is a supervisor under the Act and an agent of Respondents; *Top Job Building Maintenance Co*., 304 NLRB 902 (1991).

However, as to Sarah Stern, Faye, and Lipo Diamond, the fact that they are designated as supervisors is not sufficient to establish their supervisory status, *Top Job*, supra, nor is the fact that employees may consider them to be supervisors. *Blue Star Ready-Mix Concrete Co*., 305 NLRB 429 (1991). Although the evidence discloses that these individuals do assign work to employees, check the work of employees, and on occasion order such employees to redo work, these functions alone are not sufficient to establish supervisory status, since it is essential to establish that the ''supervisors'' exercised independent judgment in the exercise of these functions. *Clark Machine Corp*., 308 NLRB 555 (1992); *Top Job*, supra; *Blue Star*, supra; *Cobra Gunskin*, 267 NLRB 264, 267 (1983). Accordingly, I conclude that General Counsel has not established that Sarah Stern, Lipo Diamond, or Faye exercise independent judgment, or that they are supervisors under Section 2(11) of the Act.

However, that is not the end of the inquiry, since even absent supervisory status, an employer can be responsible for the conduct of an employee as an agent, in particular situations, where under all the circumstances, the employees would reasonably believe that the employee was reflecting company policy and acting on behalf of management. *United*

[18] Stern is also the aunt of Beirel's wife.

Cloth Co., 278 NLRB 583, 586 (1986); *EDP Medical Computer Systems*, 284 NLRB 1232, 1265 (1987); *Wm. Chalson & Co*., 252 NLRB 25, 33–34 (1980); *Community Cash*, supra.

Here the activities of Sarah Stern and Lipo Diamond which are alleged to be violative of the Act, involve their actions in supervising and correcting the work of Galarza and Nieves. In these circumstances, it is clear that Respondents have placed Stern and Diamond in positions where the employees clearly had a reasonable belief that Stern and Diamond were acting on behalf of management, at least in connection with their supervision and correction of the work of the employees. Thus, Stern[19] and Diamond were acting as agents of Respondents in these particular areas. *Albertson's, Inc*., 267 NLRB 534 (1983); *Quality Drywall Corp*., 254 NLRB 617, 620 (1987).

I shall leave the discussion of the agency status of Faye as well as employee Maria Reina to the evaluation of the specific unfair labor practices attributed to their conduct.

C. *Alleged 8(a)(1) and (2) and 8(b)(1)(A) Conduct*

The ILG began their most recent organizing campaign in December 1988. The ILG representatives would stand outside the plant distributing leaflets to employees as they entered and left. In late December 1988, an ILG leaflet had been hung from the light string near the lunchtable where a number of employees, including employee Bella Martinez, were having lunch. Beirel walked by and read the ILG leaflet. He then turned around and said to the employees, ''don't take those papers—that's the mafia.'' This comment is virtually identical to the statements made by representatives of Respondents in the Southland-Metro case, which were found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act therein. 260 NLRB at 650, 655. Accordingly, I find Beirel's remarks herein also to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Similarly, in March and April 1989, Beirel on three occasions instructed employee Carmen Nieves not to take ILG literature or if they take it, to rip it up, or not to pay attention to the ILG papers. These remarks are also violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find.

In April 1989, Beirel approached Francisca Aguilar in the plant. He asked her to help him give out leaflets for his Union (Local 17-18), because the people from the ILG were there. Beirel added that she should tell the other employees that his union was good and that they were going to have a lot of work. Beirel also told Aguilar that he was going to pay her for helping him, as he had the time before.[20] Aguilar replied that she was not accepting his offer. Beirel responded, ''you support the other Union. You support the International. I am not going to trust you anymore.'' I find that Beirel's offer to Aguilar to pay her to assist him in telling employees that in effect support for Local 17-18 would result in a lot of work for the employees, constitutes unlawful promises of benefit to employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as well as unlawful assistance to Local 17-18 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. I also conclude that Beirel's statement to Aguilar that he was not ''going to trust her anymore'' because she would not assist him in his attempts to induce employees to support Local 17-18, is a further violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. *Metropolitan Life Insurance Co*., 256 NLRB 626, 633 (1981), and cases cited therein.

In April 1989, Beirel told employees that if the ILG came in, he would have no problems, he would close the factory. On approximately 10 occasions during 1989 and 1990, Lugo heard Beirel tell employees at the factory that he didn't want the ILG and that he would rather close the factory down before the Union gets in. These statements are clear violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so find.

Similarly, in the course of his discharge of employee Bella Martinez to be discussed infra, Beirel mentioned ''everyone outside,'' which I conclude referred to the ILG organizers then passing out leaflets, and stated that he was going to fire everyone and close down. I find this statement to be an unlawful threat of discharge, as well as a threat to close down, because of the organizing actions of the ILG, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

Additionally, on or about November 27, Vicky, whom I found above to be a supervisor and agent, told employees that Beirel was going to shut down the factory because of the other union that wants to get in. I find this statement also to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

This finding is based on the affidavit of Aura Funez, which General Counsel introduced into evidence through the credible testimony of the NLRB representatives, as well as Funez' admission that her signature appeared on the documents. While at the trial, Funez testified that she did not even recall giving the statement, or recall any of the events included therein, I do not credit her testimony in this regard, and find that her professed lack of memory was simply a ruse to refuse to answer questions. *New Life Bakery*, 301 NLRB 421 (1991). I conclude that Funez, who was still employed by Respondents, was so frightened about testifying against Respondents, particularly in view of the extensive unfair labor practices committed by Respondents, that she chose to simply claim that she did not remember anything in her statement.[21]

Based on the above, I conclude that it is appropriate to consider the affidavit of Funez as substantive evidence, as a past recollection recorded under Section 803(5) of the Federal Rules. *New Life Bakery*, supra. See also *Snaider Syrup Corp*., 220 NLRB 238 fn. 1 (1975); *Starlite Mfg. Co*., 172 NLRB 68, 72 (1968), in which such an affidavit was accepted as substantive evidence even apart from Section 803 of the Federal Rules.

According to the affidavit of Funez, sometime in November, Maria Reina, an employee from the blind stitch section, came to her machine during working hours circulating a petition indicating that the employees do not want to belong to the ILG. The affidavit adds that Reina told her that the petition should be signed by those who want to keep their jobs because Local 17-18 was the union the employees needed to keep.

Reina was also one of the shop stewards for Local 17-18, and the record reveals that Respondents permitted her to

[19] Being an aunt of Beirel's wife, which is an additional factor supporting reasonable belief of employees that she was acting on behalf of management. *United Cloth*, supra at 586.

[20] As detailed above, Aguilar accepted $150 from Beirel in 1985 for performing such services for Beirel.

[21] I note that it was necessary to enforce the subpoena against her in Federal court, and have her brought to the trial by the Marshall.

make announcements on behalf of Local 17-18 over Respondents public address system to the employees. General Counsel argues that Respondents' action in permitting Reina to use their public address system, makes her an agent of Respondents. I do not agree.

The test for agency as noted above is whether in all the circumstances the employees would reasonably believe that the employee was speaking for management. In my view, that test is not met, by the mere fact that Reina was allowed to make announcements on behalf of Local 17-18 over the public address system. It seems that employees are just as likely to believe that Reina was speaking on behalf of Local 17-18 when making these announcements, particularly in view of her position as shop steward for that union. Therefore, I conclude that the permission to Reina to use Respondents' public address system is not sufficient in itself to make her an agent for Respondents, and General Counsel has not established any other probative evidence,[22] that might make Reina an agent for Respondents with respect to this incident. Thus, I do not find Respondents to be responsible for Reina's conduct in either circulating the petition or threatening loss of jobs. Therefore, these allegations must be dismissed.

Funez' affidavit also described an incident that occurred on December 7, 1989. At that time, Funez (who was also one of Local 17-18's shop stewards) was called into a meeting at Respondents premises by Javier Jara, a representative of Local 17-18. Also present were another Local 17-18 representative, and four other shop stewards, including Reina and Arlene. Faye came into the office and asserted that there was a problem in the factory, and that she had circulated a petition among the employees because if the other Union (ILG) got in, she wanted to protect her job, because Beirel was going to close the factory. One of the Local 17-18 representatives said they knew of two or three people who signed for the ''other union,'' but he did not know all the names.

Faye replied that she could try to find out who signed for the other Union, and suggested that Local 17-18 ''people''[23] do the same. Faye handed the petitions that she and Maria Reina had circulated to the Local 17-18 representatives, who replied that they needed help and that the petitions were important.

General Counsel argues that during this meeting Respondents by Faye violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening plant closure, and Section 8(a)(1) and (2) by offering to engage in surveillance of employees on behalf of Local 17-18, and by soliciting on behalf of Local 17-18 a petition amongst employees, and turning the petition over to Local 17-18 representatives. However, because I have found above that General Counsel had not established that Faye was a supervisor of Respondents under Section 2(11) of the Act, and General Counsel has not argued, nor does the record support, an inference that she can otherwise be found to be an agent of Respondents, I cannot find Respondents responsible for her conduct. Accordingly, I am constrained to dismiss these allegations of the complaint.

This incident also forms the basis for the complaint allegation against Local 17-18, which alleges in substance that Local 17-18 by accepting Respondents' offer to engage in surveillance of Respondents' employees to learn the identity of ILG supporters and disclose said information to Local 17-18, has created the impression among the employees of Respondents that their activities on behalf of the ILG were being kept under surveillance.

Because I have dismissed the complaint allegations against Respondents concerning the events of this meeting, because General Counsel has not established the agency status of Faye, it follows that the allegations against Local 17-18 must be similarly dismissed. It is also noteworthy that all the employees present at this meeting were Local 17-18 shop stewards, so that the discussions about ascertaining the identity of Local ILG adherents was solely among agents of Local 17-18, without any nonagent employees of Local 17-18 ever being aware of the discussion.

I also would note that all the evidence with respect to this issue came from Funez' affidavit, even though General Counsel could have adduced such evidence from other witnesses who were present. I would be reluctant to find a violation against Local 17-18 solely on the basis of the affidavit. Although, as noted, there is precedent for the reliance on such evidence, it is questionable whether a violation should be found based on such an affidavit by itself, where other probabtive evidence was possible. *New Life Bakery*, supra.

Finally, I would also observe that Local 17-18 despite its conflict with the ILG, vigorously pursued the grievances of known ILG supporters, Nieves, Chalston, and Martinez and successfully obtained their reinstatement through arbitration. In such circumstances, it is questionable whether the purposes of the Act would be effectuated by the issuance of an order against Local 17-18 for a single instance and a relatively minor violation of creating the impression of surveillance.

In April 1989, Beirel approached Nieves at work and asked her whether she had signed anything for the ILG. Nieves replied no, although she in fact had signed a card. Around the same time, Beirel used Nieves to translate for him in talking with employees Angela Caravallo and Maria Rivera. Beirel, through Nieves, asked the employees if they had been visited at home by representatives of the ILG. The employees replied that they had been visited by no one. Beirel added that if the ILG came in, he would have no problems because he would close the factory.

Around the same period of time, Beirel called employee Gloria Soto into his office and asked her what the ILG offered and whether she had signed for the ILG. Soto denied signing a card, but added that she liked their benefits.

I find that all of these instances of questioning by Beirel constitute coercive interrogations under the standards of *Rossmore House*, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984), and that by such conduct, Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. *BMD*, supra at 156; *EDP*, supra at 1264–1265.

Soto also testified that on one or two occasions in March or April, she observed Beirel standing outside the factory door looking at the ILG representatives handing out leaflets to employees as they were leaving work. She further testified that Beirel was standing about 8 feet away from the

[22] Although Funez' affidavit reflects that Beirel and Supervisor Faye ''were in the area'' while Reina circulated the petition, this statement is not sufficiently precise to establish that Beirel actually observed or was aware of Reina's actions in this regard.

[23] By reference to 17-18 ''people,'' the affidavit does not make clear whether that refers to the representatives or the employees, who as noted were all shop stewards.

leafletters, but did not testify for how long a period of time she noticed him observing. Soto also testified that Beirel does not usually stand at the door when employees leave work.

General Counsel alleges that because it was not normal practice for Beirel to stand outside the factory door and observe employees as they leave, that his conduct herein constitutes unlawful surveillance.

However, it is well settled that where, as here, union activity is conducted openly at or near company premises, open observation of such activities by an employer is not unlawful. *Roadway Package Systems*, 302 NLRB 961 (1991); *Mademoiselle Knitwear*, 297 NLRB 272, 278 (1989); *EDP*, supra at 1265–1266.

While in some situations, conduct well ''out of the ordinary'' has been deemed sufficient to transform casual observation to unlawful conduct, *Eddylean Chocolate Co*., 301 NLRB 887 (1991); *Impact Industries*, 285 NLRB 5 fn. 2 (1987), the mere fact that Beirel usually does not stand outside the door when employees leave is not sufficient, particularly in view of lack of evidence of ''continuous scrutiny'' (*Impact*, supra) of union activity to establish a violation of the Act.

I shall therefore recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint.

As will be more fully detailed below, on several occasions between October 1990 and February 1991, Beirel issued instructions to Respondents' mechanic Israel Galarza not to speak with employee Carmen Nieves because she was trying to bring in or was a supporter of the ILG. On one occasion, Beirel accompanied this admonition with a threat to close the factory, and on another with a threat that if Galarza did not comply with the order, ''he would be damaged.'' Additionally, on another occasion, Beirel ordered Galarza not to fix Nieves' machine, unless Pablo approved, which was contrary to past practice, and contrary to the practice concerning other employees, where machines are fixed at the direct request of the employee themselves.

I find all of these actions by Beirel, i.e., the admonishment not to talk to Nieves, the threat to close, the threat that Galarza would be ''damaged'' if he did not comply with Respondents' order not to talk to Nieves, and the order not to fix her machine unless Pablo approved, to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Additionally, the order with respect to changing practices with regard to fixing Nieves' machine is also violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as it is a change in terms and conditions of employment.

During the February 9, 1991 discussions between Beirel and Galarza about this subject, Beirel told him that he knew that Galarza was still speaking with Nieves, and that he knew that Nieves would drive Galarza to the train. Beirel again forbid Galarza from talking with Nieves because she was a ''bad woman,'' and she wanted to get the ''union'' in. Galarza responded that it seemed that Beirel had a person who was telling him everything that Galarza did. Beirel did not respond.

General Counsel contends and I agree that Beirel's comments to Galarza that he knew that Galarza was still talking to Nieves and in fact was driving with her to the train, constitutes an unlawful creation of the impression of surveillance of employees' union activity.

While there is no evidence that Galarza himself engaged in any union activities, it is clear as detailed above and below that Nieves was a leading adherent for the ILG and that Respondents had unlawfully issued instructions to employees, including Galarza not to speak with her, because of her union activities. Therefore, it is also clear that Respondents believed that Galarza was engaged or would be likely to engage in activities on behalf of the ILG, if and when he spoke with Nieves. In these circumstances, I conclude that Beirel's remarks had the reasonable effect of creating the impression that Respondents were keeping under surveillance the known or suspected union activities of Nieves and Galarza, and is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. *Escada U.S.A*., 304 NLRB 845 (1991); *Operating Engineers Local 302*, 299 NLRB 245 (1990); *Great Dane Trailers*, 293 NLRB 384, 385 (1989).

D. *Alleged Discrimination Against Carment Nieves*

Carment Nieves began her employment with Three Sisters in September 1987 as a merrow machine operator. She was hired by Beirel and worked as a pieceworker most of the time, with an occasional assignment as an hourly paid worker from Pablo.

In December 1988, Nieves attended an ILG organizing meeting at the home of another employee. Nieves signed a card at that time, and assisted other employees in filling out their cards. Nieves attended another union meeting in January 1989, wherein she was given authorization cards to distribute to employees. Thereafter, Nieves distributed and obtained six cards from employees during lunch hour in the bathroom.

In March 1989, the ILG organizers were distributing leaflets to Respondents' employees outside the plant. About 5 p.m., as Nieves was preparing to leave, Beirel approached her and another merrow machine operator. Beirel told them that the ILG representatives were handing out literature downstairs, and instructed the employees not to take it or if they took it to rip it up. Beirel also asked Nieves to stay with him and transmit this message to other employees in Spanish for him. Nieves refused telling Beirel that she was going home. On two other subsequent occasions in late March or early April, Beirel again instructed Nieves not to pay any attention to the ILG papers and not to take them.

As noted above, I have found that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by this conduct as well as by interrogating Nieves and other employees about whether ILG representatives have visited their home, or signed cards and by threatening Nieves and other employees with shutdown of the plant if the ILG were to come into the factory. Beirel also utilized the services of Nieves to translate to other employees the threat to close the factory.

In May 1989, Nieves was working on a blind stitch sewing machine, along with seven other of her coworkers. Because of the difficulty of making the sleeve on that machine, Nieves after discussing the matter with her fellow employees, asked Beirel on behalf of all the eight employees for more money for this work. Beirel agreed to give the employees extra money, but when they received their paychecks the next week, the employees believed that the money that they received was insufficient. The employees then decided to speak to Beirel, with Nieves as spokesperson. The employees went as a group to speak to Beirel, and Nieves told him that

he had not kept his word, and the amount of money paid was too little for the kind of work being performed. Beirel responded that he could not pay any more, and if anyone was not in agreement, they could work on the merrow machines.

The next working day, the employees came to work in a group and asked for their merrow machines. Beirel attempted to convince them to work on the blind stitch machine, but Nieves insisted that the employees would not do so without an agreement for higher wages. Beirel said he would think about it next week. Nieves replied that the employees cannot wait until next week. Finally, after initially agreeing to allow them to work on the merrow machine, Beirel changed his mind and told the employees including Nieves to go home, that he had no work for them. The next day, Nieves returned and asked to be returned to work on the blind stitch machine. Beirel refused, telling Nieves that she was a troublemaker, and that she was the one who was instigating the other workers to demand better prices.

Subsequently, Nieves and the other employees spoke to a representative from Local 17-18 about their discharge. Shortly thereafter, Nieves was reinstated by Respondents to her position as a merrow machine operator.

On November 19, 1989, Nieves made an announcement on a Spanish radio station in favor of the ILG. In the announcement, Nieves identified herself by name, indicated that she had signed for the ILG, that Local 17-18 ''was not a real union,'' and that the ILG was a ''real union.'' On November 24, Beirel told Nieves that he had heard her announcement on the radio. Nieves replied that he (Beirel) doesn't listen to Spanish radio, somebody must have told him. Beirel replied that he had heard it.

Shortly thereafter, in late November, Beirel prohibited Nieves from translating for other employees to him, as she had frequently done in the past. In fact, as noted at times Beirel would use Nieves himself to translate to other employees. On this occasion, Beirel told Nieves that she had no business being an interpreter for other employees, told her to return to work, and added that she (Nieves) was a troublemaker. Beirel continued that she ''was causing a lot of trouble in the factory,'' and that if she wanted to be a lawyer, she should open up an office.

On or about November 21, an employee was talking to Nieves about a work-related matter. Beirel approached them and asked the employee (named Maritza) what she was doing talking to Nieves. Maritza replied that she was asking about some sleeves. Beirel instructed Maritza that she was not supposed to talk to Nieves and, if she needed anything, she should talk to Pablo. A few days later, another employee came to Nieves' machine to talk to her about getting paid for Thanksgiving. At that time, David Jacobowitz came over and, after asking the employee what she was talking to Nieves about, took the employee into the office for 10–12 minutes. Prior to these incidents, employees would often come to Nieves' machine to talk to her, and Respondents' officials never complained about this to Nieves or any other employee. Moreover, other employees also have spoken to their fellow employees about work-related or other matters during the course of the workday, without any criticism from management. Moreover, there is no evidence of the existence of any rule by Respondents against talking to other employees during work.

On or about November 28, about 5:05 p.m., employee Delfia Cajeho was talking to Nieves about the subject of pay for Thanksgiving. Beirel came over and asked Cajeho what she was talking to Nieves about and added that she was not supposed to talk to Nieves. Cajeho replied that it was after 5 p.m. Beirel instructed Cajeho to go to work or go home. Cajeho responded that if he (Beirel) had a problem with Nieves, that was between the two of them, but Nieves was her friend and she would talk to her. Beirel did not respond, and went back to the office.

A few minutes later, Beirel came to Nieves' machine, and told her that he wanted to speak to her in his office because of the argument between Cajeho and Beirel about Cajeho talking to Nieves. Nieves replied that she had been instructed by Pablo to finish a particular bundle. Beirel insisted that she stop work and accompany him into his office, where David Jacobowitz was present. David began by telling her not to scream at him. Nieves shrugged her shoulders and replied that she had not said a word. David then shook his finger at Nieves and said, ''You are fired, you are fired, you are fired.'' Nieves asked why? At that point, David screamed and called her a ''son of a bitch,'' a ''whore,'' and a ''mother fucker,'' and told her, ''get out of here, I don't want to see you in this factory any more.'' Nieves felt a knot in her throat, and asked David what he had said. He repeated what he said, adding ''that's exactly what you are, what I said, you are a son of a bitch, you're a shit, you're a whore—get out of my factory.'' Beirel then began to scream also, that Nieves was fired, that she should leave and that she was fired. At that point, Nieves began to leave, but Beirel crossed in front of her and blocked her from exiting the office. According to Nieves, she felt it was like a rosary. The Jacobowitzes kept repeating the same things over and over again. They were asking her to leave and yet they wouldn't allow her to leave.

At that point, David opened the door and yelled to Pablo that Nieves was fired and he should not allow her to come to work the next day. David then turned to Nieves and told her to leave the factory right away, or he would call the police and have her handcuffed and removed.

Nieves was not allowed to return to her work station to retrieve her coat and handbag. David instructed Pablo to bring her belongings, at which time Nieves began to cry. She asked why she was being fired. David replied that she knew the reason why.

Subsequent to her discharge, Local 17-18 filed an arbitration on behalf of Nieves, protesting her discharge. A hearing was held, and the arbitrator issued his decision on March 24, 1990, overturning the discharge, on technical grounds, but also crediting Nieves' version of events as to who used profane language.[24] On April 4, 1990, Nieves attempted to return to work accompanied by Local 17-18's business agent, Javier Jara. Beirel refused to permit her to return to work, notwithstanding the issuance of the arbitrator's decision, and threatened to call the police unless she left the premises.

Finally, after additional efforts on her behalf by Local 17-18, Nieves was reinstated on May 7, 1990. After Nieves' re-

[24] Nieves also filed for unemployment insurance and, after a hearing, the administrative law judge at the New York State Unemployment Insurance Division also credited Nieves and granted her unemployment benefits in a decision issued on February 23, 1990.

turn in May 1990, Funez observed Pablo removing an ILG button from Nieves' handbag. After her return, however, Nieves was not assigned to her old machine or her old section. Instead, she was isolated from other employees, with her back to all the other workers, in an area surrounded by broken or damaged machines which were not being operated. Previous to her discharge, she was assigned to operate a machine which was in the midst of other employees on all sides of her.

When Nieves was hired in 1987, as a merrow machine operator, she had 20 years of sewing experience. Merrow machine operators are paid on a piecework basis.

Prior to her discharge in 1989, each morning, she would receive 5 bundles of material, which included 36 pieces to sew. Generally, the bundles would all be of the same style and colors. Usually throughout the day, she would receive a total of 10 or 11 bundles, mostly of the same color. Changing colors requires the operator to change the threads on the machine, which causes the operator to spend additional time. She rarely had to change threads three times a day prior to her termination.

When she returned to work on May 7. 1990, Nieves was assigned more difficult work of sewing collars and sleeves, than she had been receiving prior to the discharge. Additionally, she was given one or two bundles at the start of the workday rather than the five bundles that she had been receiving prior to the discharge, and the five bundles that all of the other machines operators continued to receive at the beginning of the day on and after May 7. Additionally, after Nieves completed her two bundles, she received bundles of different colors which required her to change threads. During the first week after her reinstatement, everyday her assignments required her to change threads two or three times a day.

Prior to the termination when she completed her bundles, she would ask for more work and receive it in 1 or 2 minutes. After her reinstatement, it took from 7 to 8 minutes for her to receive new bundles. Her coworkers, however, continued to receive new bundles quickly. On a few occasions, Nieves attempted to pick up the bundles herself, rather than to wait for them to be brought to her. However, Pablo told her not to do so, and to go back to her machine and wait for someone to bring her some work. Additionally, after the reinstatement, Nieves would frequently receive bundles without threads or without sufficient quantities of labels. After asking for the threads and labels, and not receiving them promptly, Nieves would once again attempt to obtain them herself. However, once more Pablo would tell her that she was not supposed to move from her machine and should wait for someone to bring her the threads. These practices have continued to the date of the hearing. At one point in October 1990, Nieves complained to Pablo that she was losing 15–20 minutes a day just waiting for bundles and materials. Pablo replied, ''that's nothing, that's nothing for you.''

Prior to the termination, Nieves' work was checked by her immediate supervisor once a day in the morning, as Nieves was an experienced seamstress. However, after reinstatement, her immediate supervisor became Sarah Stern, who, as noted, is the aunt of Beirel's wife. Stern would constantly be checking her work, on the average of six or seven times in the morning and about the same number of times in the afternoon. During the first week after her return, Stern checked Nieves' work every 20 minutes. Stern would check each bundle from the first piece to the last. Her prior supervisor, Berta, would check only the first piece in each bundle. Frequently, Stern would tell Nieves that the work was not properly done and ordered Nieves to sew it over again although the work was competently done.[25] Berta, her prior supervisor, never instructed Nieves to resew her work prior to her termination.

After her reinstatement, Respondents continued its policy of forbidding employees to talk to Nieves. On May 8, the day after her reinstatement, several employees came to Nieves' machine to either borrow a pen or discuss work-related matters. Pablo either personally or over the loudspeaker would tell these other employees to return to their machines. In the personal conversations, Pablo asked the employees what they were doing at Nieves' machine and what they were talking about while ordering them back to their machines. Nieves was the only employee subject to this treatment, as other employees were permitted to talk to fellow workers at their machines, without Pablo or any supervisor telling them to return to their machines.

In October 1990, Beirel instructed Israel Galarza, Respondents' mechanic, not to speak with Nieves because she was trying to introduce the ILG. Later on in October, Beirel reiterated the prohibition to Galarza about speaking to Nieves because she wants to ''get the other union in the factory.'' Beirel added a threat of plant closure if this occurred. In November, Beirel instructed Galarza, contrary to past practice, that he should no longer fix Nieves' machine on her direct request, but that Pablo must approve such action. Beirel added that Nieves ''is a very bad woman . . . she wanted to hurt him by getting the other union in.''

Finally, Respondents' continuing animus towards Nieves was displayed even during the course of the instant hearing. Thus, Nieves received a subpoena to appear at the NLRB for the instant hearing on Monday, June 24, 1991. She notified Pablo on Friday, June 21 of this fact and he said ''okay, that's fine.'' However, on Monday, she was not called as a witness and was told to appear on Tuesday, June 25. When she called Pablo on Monday in the afternoon, he asked her why she hadn't been at work. She reminded him that she had informed him on Friday that she had been supoenaed to appear at the NLRB. Pablo replied that she had been absent too many times, and asked her if she was working for Respondents or the NLRB. Nieves responded that it was not her fault. Pablo answered, ''if you are with them, then you better go and work for them.'' He added, ''When she returns, she better talk to Beirel.''

Analyzing the termination under the criteria of *Wright Line*, 251 NLRB 1053 (1980), enfd. 662 F2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), and *Transportation Management Co*., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), it is clear that General Counsel has established a strong prima facie case that a motivating factor in Respondents' discharge of Nieves was her activities on behalf of the ILG and other protected conduct. Thus, immediately after Beirel admitted knowledge of Nieves' ILG support, by telling her that he had heard her radio broadcast in favor of the

[25] Nieves who worked as a pieceworker, would not be paid any additional money for having to resew the garment.

ILG, he called her a troublemaker,[26] refused to allow her to translate for employees as he had in the past, and isolated her from her coworkers by ordering other employees not to talk to her. Four days later, she was terminated. Also, Nieves was subject to previous interrogations. threats of plant closure, and unlawful instructions by Beirel not to accept ILG literature. Indeed, Nieves was used by Beirel to translate some of his unlawful instructions and threats to other employees.

Thus, the timing of the discharge, 4 days after the radio commencement, coupled with the significant animus towards the ILG in general and Nieves in particular,[27] as well as her protected conduct involving the pricing dispute, establish that protected activities were motivating factors in Respondent's decision to terminate her.

The burden then shifts to Respondents to establish that they would have taken the same action against her, absent such protected conduct. *Wright Line*, supra. Because Respondents have adduced no evidence as to why they discharged her, they have not met that burden.

Moreover, the humiliating manner in which she was discharged, for no apparent reason, and accompanied by a disgraceful exhibition of profanity and physically preventing her from leaving, further reinforces the conclusion that her discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I so find.

I also find that Respondents' verbal abuse of Nieves and their physical prevention of Nieves from leaving constitutes independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. *Kenrich Petrochemicals*, 294 NLRB 519, 534–535 (1989).

Subsequent to her reinstatement, I conclude that Respondents continued their unlawful treatment of Nieves. I note initially Respondents' refusal to initially agree to reinstate her after the arbitration decision, and their threat to call the police if she did not leave at that time. This is demonstrative of continued animus towards Nieves, which Respondents further manifested by isolating her from other employees, forbidding other employees from speaking with her, forbidding the mechanic to fix her machine on her request, subjecting her to closer supervision, and giving her difficult, fewer and slower assignments, which reduced her earning opportunities in view of her piecework status.

I find that all of these actions were also motivated by Nieves' protected conduct, as detailed above. Since once more Respondents have adduced no evidence as to why they took any of these actions, they have not met their burden of proving that they would have acted in the same way absent her protected activities. Therefore, I conclude that Respondents have further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by these actions against Nieves. *BMD*, supra at 160; *Heartland of Lansing Nursing Home*, 307 NLRB 152 (1992).

[26] Although the troublemaker remark may also have referred to Nieves' previous activities of being spokesperson on behalf of employees protesting Respondents' wage policies, this conduct of Nieves is also protected concerted activity.

[27] I note also in this regard the statements made to Galarza by Beirel wherein he instructed Galarza not to speak to her or fix her machine on request, because she wanted to hurt Beirel by trying to get the ILG into the factory.

E. *The Alleged Discrimination Against Bella Martinez*

Bella Martinez was hired by Respondents in 1987 as a merrow machine operator. As noted, in December 1988, Martinez was present with a group of employees, when Beirel unlawfully removed an ILG leaflet from the light cable and instructed the employees not to take these papers because it was the mafia. In the summer of 1989, on a number of occasions, Beirel instructed Martinez and other employees not to accept the ILG literature.

In 1989, Martinez circulated a petition for the ILG among her fellow employees, which had been given to her by an ILG representative. Martinez also was given a coffee mug which prominently displayed the name International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, as well as the statement ''look for the union label.'' Martinez kept this coffee mug at her machine at Respondents' premises. She would use the mug while eating lunch at the lunch table, in the presence of Pablo who would frequently join the employees for lunch at the same table.

Additionally, Martinez would drink from her mug at her machine, during which time both Beirel and Pablo would walk by from 8–25 feet away from her.

On December 1, 1987, the merrow machine operators received their pay for the Thanksgiving week. Martinez, as well as a number of the other operators, discussed among themselves their mutual dissatisfaction with the amount of holiday pay that they had received for Thanksgiving. Beirel came over to the group of employees and asked Martinez what was the problem. Martinez replied that she was not happy with the holiday pay, and that ''we had worked all week long and we hadn't made money . . . and we were neither slaves or children to do that.'' Beirel then told Martinez that if she didn't agree with that, she could leave. Beirel then stated that if Martinez wanted to talk to him, she should go to the office. Martinez told Beirel to wait a minute because she was finishing with a part.

Beirel at that point became incensed, came over to her machine, broke the threads from the machine, and told Martinez to leave quickly. Beirel then pulled her chair and Martinez' shoulder causing her to injure her knee. Beirel then pushed Martinez to the door while screaming and yelling that he ''didn't want neither insects or roaches there.'' Beirel added that he was going to clean the factory and that he was going to fire everyone outside and was going to close down. He continued to scream that he was going to close the factory four or five times. When they reached the door, Beirel told Pablo that Martinez didn't respect him and that she should leave. Beirel would not permit Martinez to gather some of her belongings such as an umbrella, scissors, and the coffee mug described above. Shortly after Martinez' termination, Funez heard Respondents' supervisor Vicky tell a group of employees that Martinez was terminated because she kept a coffee mug with an ILG insignia at her work station.

At some point after the discharge, Local 17-18 filed for arbitration protesting the discharge of Martinez. The arbitrator, after a hearing, overturned the discharge and ordered Martinez to be reinstated.

Respondents adduced no testimony or evidence as to why they terminated Martinez.

Once more a strong prima facie case that protected conduct of Martinez was a motivating factor in her termination has been established. Respondents argue that no evidence

was adduced to show that Respondents were aware of any union activities on the part of Martinez. I do not agree.

I conclude, contrary to Respondents' assertion, that they were aware of the fact that Martinez used a coffee mug with the name ILG prominently displayed therein. Because Pablo regularly had lunch at the same table with Martinez and the other employees when she used the cup, I find it likely that he observed and read the logo on the cup. I also find it probable that Beirel and Pablo observed her drinking from the mug while at her machine. Most significantly, I rely on the admission against Respondents by the statement made by its supervisor, Vicky, that Respondents terminated Martinez because of the coffee mug at her work station. This constitutes an admission establishing knowledge of her union activity, as well as substantial evidence connecting her discharge to such activity. Moreover, at the time of the discharge, while Beirel was ranting and raving, he mentioned the ''people outside,'' obviously referring to the union representatives outside the plant distributing literature, and threatened to close the factory five times. Finally, Martinez was one of the employees present when Beirel ripped an ILG flyer from the light string, and unlawfully instructed employees not to accept these papers, while saying ''that's the mafia.'' Based on these circumstances, an inference is clearly warranted that Respondents knew or at least suspected that Martinez was a supporter of the ILG.

Moreover, I also conclude that Martinez' conduct on the day of her discharge, of protesting on behalf of herself and the other employees, Respondents' holiday pay, and her statement that the employees were not slaves or children, constitutes protected concerted activity. Because the discharge itself occurred immediately after the confrontation between Martinez and Beirel, I find that this activity was a motivating factor in Respondents' decision to terminate her.

Based on the animus directed towards the ILG as detailed above, including the statement made by Nieves, and the close proximity of Martinez' discharge to the unlawful discharge of Nieves, I conclude that Martinez' activities on behalf of the ILG was also a motivating factor in Respondents' decision to discharge her.

Once again because Respondents have adduced no evidence as to their reasons for terminating her, they have again failed to meet their *Wright Line* burden of establishing that they would have taken the same action against her, absent her protected conduct. Similarly, as in the case of Nieves, the evidence that Martinez was discharged for no apparent valid reason, plus Beirel's conduct in screaming at her, pulling a chair out from under her and pushing her at the time of the discharge, further reinforces my conclusion that her discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

I also find that as in the case of Nieves, Respondents independently violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by verbally abusing and assaulting Martinez because of her protected activities at the time of the discharge. *Kenrich*, supra.

F. *The Alleged Discrimination Against Israel Galarza*

Galarza was employed by Respondents as a mechanic since 1983, and was responsible for the maintenance of some 300 sewing machines. He was paid $1200 per week, $200 by check and the rest in cash.

In October 1990, Beirel directed Galarza not to speak with Nieves because she was trying to introduce the ILG. A few weeks later, Beirel again admonished Galarza not to speak to Nieves because she wants to ''get the other Union into the factory.'' Beirel coupled this remark with a threat to close if the ILG gets in. In November, while ordering Galarza not to fix Nieves' machine unless Pablo approves, Beirel added that she ''is a very bad woman . . . and wanted to hurt him by getting the Union in.'' During this same conversation, Beirel informed Galarza that he knew that Galarza was still talking to Nieves and he must stop it. In early December, Beirel again admonished Galarza about speaking to Nieves, this time coupling the warning with a threat that Galarza ''would be damaged.''

Subsequent to this conversation, in December 1990, Sarah Stern and Lupo Diamond began to consistently criticize Galarza's work and require him to fix the machines again, even though the machine operator was satisfied with the repair and the machine was operating properly. At times, Stern or Diamond would force him to fix the very same machine three to five times. Galarza tried to complain to Beirel about this excessive supervision, but Beirel responded that he was too busy to speak with him.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding Beirel's instructions, Galarza continued to speak with Nieves about personal or job-related matters, although they had no discussion about Unions.

On December 20, 1990, Beirel notified Galarza that he would receive no yearend bonus and his pay would be reduced from 15 to 20 percent. Galarza went home sick when Beirel notified him of these matters. Beirel called Galarza at home and convinced him to return the next day in return for the payment of $1000 of his bonus payment.[28] Respondents did not cut Galarza's pay at that time, despite Beirel's threat to do so.

In February 1991, Beirel informed Galarza that he knew that he was still talking and driving with Nieves,[29] and that Beirel ''forbid it'' because Nieves ''is a bad woman,'' and was trying to get the Union in.

On Friday, March 1, 1991, Respondents finally carried out their threat to reduce Galarza's salary. He was given a check for $625, which amounted to a reduction from $740 (which includes $260 in deductions from his previous nonpayroll compensation of $1000). When Galarza protested this reduction, Beirel agreed there was a mistake, took the check, and returned with another check for even less money $543 and gave it to Galarza. Galarza threatened to expose Respondents to the Labor Department. Subsequently, Galarza agreed to voluntarily resign, in exchange for being paid his full salary for that week plus 1 week's severance pay. Galarza signed a letter that he voluntarily resigned.

Respondents contend initially that the allegations with respect to Galarza should all be dismissed based on Galarza's alleged lack of credibility. I do not agree. While Respondents do point to some minor contradictions between his testimony and that of Nieves, I found Galarza to be a candid and believable witness, and my factual findings detailed above are based primarily on such credited testimony, which I note has not been contradicted, challenged, or denied by any witness of Respondents. Moreover, Respondents have adduced no evidence or witnesses as to why they took any of the above-

[28] In 1989, Galarza received a bonus of $2000.

[29] As noted above, on occasion Nieves would drive Galarza to the subway station and drop him off there.

detailed actions against Galarza, including particularly the change in supervision, cutting of his bonus, or the reduction of his salary.

In applying the *Wright Line* criteria to these changes in Galarza's working conditions, I conclude that General Counsel has established that protected conduct was a motivating factor in these actions. In this regard, I note that despite the lack of evidence that Galarza himself engaged in any union or protected activities, it is clear that Respondents perceived him to be a friend of Nieves. Thus, Respondents have constantly admonished Galarza for violating their previous instructions (which I have previously found unlawful) not to speak to Nieves, while accompanying these admonishments with references to Nieves' activities on behalf of the ILG. It is well settled that adverse action against an employee who is not known to have engaged in Union activity, but who has a close relationship with a known union adherent may give rise to an inference of discrimination. *BMD*, supra at 143; *Permanent Label Corp*., 248 NLRB 118, 136 (1980), enfd. 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981). Thus, action taken by an employer motivated by an employer's belief or suspicion than an employee engaged in union activity violates the Act. *BMD*, supra; *S&R Sundries*, 272 NLRB 1352, 1356–1357 (1984).

I have already concluded that Respondents by their discharge of Nieves (a leading adherent for the ILG), as well as by their subsequent unlawful treatment of Nieves after her reinstatement, including their unlawful instruction to employees not to speak with her, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

I conclude therefore that because Galarza disobeyed these unlawful instructions and continued to converse with Nieves, that Respondents believed that Galarza as a result of his relationship with Nieves, was also an adherent of the ILG. I also find that based on the timing of the adverse actions, concurrently with or shortly after Respondents' continued unlawful admonishments to Galarza not to speak with Nieves, and the other unfair practices found against Respondents, most particularly the discrimination against Nieves, that Respondents' closer supervision of Galarza, and their decision to reduce his bonus and cut his pay, were motivated by their belief that Galarza as a result of his association with Nieves, was also a supporter of the ILG.

Once again, because Respondents have adduced no evidence that any of these actions would have taken place, absent their perception of Galarza's support for the ILG, they have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I so find.

I also conclude that the changes instituted in Galarza's working conditions, i.e., the closer supervision, reduction of his bonus, and most significantly the substantial reduction of his salary, were so intolerable so as to force Galarza to resign, and that Respondents would reasonably have expected Galarza to quit as a result of these changes. In these circumstances a finding of constructive discharge is warranted. *Algreco Sportswear Co*., 271 NLRB 499, 500 (1984); *Mfg. Services*, 295 NLRB 254, 255 (1986); *Bronx Metal Polishing*, 276 NLRB 299, 304–305 (1985); *BMD*, supra at 160–161.

Thus, the changes in working conditions made Galarza's continued employment with Respondents untenable and compelled his resignation. The foreseeability of his resignation, coupled with Respondents' animus, combines to support a finding that this was the intended result of Respondents' conduct. *BMD*, supra, *Bronx Metal*, supra.

Accordingly, I conclude that Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by constructively discharging Galarza.

G. *Alleged Discrimination Against Rosita Chalston*

Rosita Chalston was hired by Respondents in March 1989 as a floorworker. She worked on the fifth floor at 144 Spencer Street under the supervision of Gary. In early November 1989, Chalston received a petition from a representative of the ILG, and was asked to obtain signatures from employees on said petition. The petition reads, ''we the workers of Three Sisters, signing this petition wish to be represented for collective bargaining with our Employer by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.''

On November 13, 14, and 15, Chalston during lunch hour solicited employees to sign the petition. Chalston signed the petition first, explained the purpose of the petition, and obtained the signatures of some 14 other employees. On November 15, Arlene, one of the shop stewards for Local 17-18 was walking around in the lunch area, during lunchtime when Chalston solicited signatures from employees.

Around 4:30 p.m. that same afternoon while in the bathroom, Chalston was approached by employee Cathy Lopez, who also acts as a translator for Gary in connection with discussions with employees. Lopez told Chalston that somebody had informed Gary about the petition. Lopez added that Chalston was going to be fired.

As she emerged from the bathroom, Chalston observed Gary talking with Arlene. As Gary and Arlene were looking at Chalston, Gary nodded his head. At the end of the day, at 5 p.m., Chalston went to the time rack to punch out, and noticed that her timecard was missing. She asked Gary, ''Where is my card?'' Gary replied that she was fired and that he no longer needed her. She asked why? Gary responded, ''because I don't need you anymore.'' As they were walking out, Chalston asked for the reasons in writing, but Gary refused, stating that ''I don't feel like it.''

Later that same week, Chalston saw a want ad in the Spanish-language newspaper ''El Diario'' for floorworkers for Three Sisters.

The next week Chalston visited the offices of Local 17-18. She spoke to Javier Jara, a business representative for Local 17-18. She explained to Jara that she had been terminated because she had solicited signatures for the ILG. Jara told her that the ILG wanted to destroy Local 17-18, but he would not allow it. Jara asked Chalston who else had signed the petition, but she did not tell him.

Jara then made a telephone call to Respondents, and informed Chalston that she had been absent from work four times in 8 months. She replied that this was not such a bad record. Jara told Chalston that he would help her get her job back, but she would have to sign a warning.

On December 11, Chalston went to the shop with Jara. At that time she signed a written warning, which had been countersigned by Gary.

In this connection, Chalston was never spoken to by management officials about any of the four absences over an 8-month period. On each of the absences, Chalston called Respondents and notified Gary that she was not going to be in that day.

When Chalston returned to work on December 11, she noticed 26 to 27 new employees working on the floor, who had not been employed by Respondents prior to her termination on November 13.

After she returned to work on December 11, Chalston solicited employees to sign authorization cards for the ILG at lunchtime near the lunch table.

Sometime, in late December 1989 or early January 1990, Chalston was approached by Maria Reina. Reina was a merrow machine operator, who as noted was also one of the shop stewards for Local 17-18. Previously, Respondents had permitted Reina to make announcements over the then public address system concerning Local 17-18 matters. Some of the announcements referred to the need to support Local 17-18 and that employees would have to be united.[30] Funez in her affidavit recalls someone made an announcement over Respondents' loudspeaker, who she did not know, in support of Local 17-18.

On the date of this conversation, Chalston observed Reina go into Beirel's office and remain there speaking with Beirel for 45 minutes. When Reina emerged from Beirel's office, she approached Chalston at her machine. Reina told Chalston that she was too smart to be collecting signatures for the ILG, and if Beirel found out about it, she could be fired.

On January 19, 1990, after Chalston punched in at 8:03 a.m., Pablo grabbed her card, scratched out the punch, and said ''no more work.'' Chalston asked if it was because she missed days, and added that she and her husband had called. Pablo replied, ''no, no, no more work.''

At that point, Chalston went to see Beirel, and told him that Pablo had fired her. Chalston explained that her child had been sick and that she had doctor's notes to prove it, which she showed to Beirel. Beirel replied that her child was always sick. Chalston offered to go on piecework. Beirel refused this request and told her to go home, take care of her child, and return to work on February 15, 1990.

On February 15, as ordered by Beirel, Chalston returned to Respondents' premises. She saw Beirel and asked if he had work for her. He replied, ''Yes, no problem.'' At that moment, Barbara, Beirel's secretary asked to speak to Beirel, and showed Beirel some papers. When he returned, Beirel informed Chalston that he was not going to permit her to return to work. Beirel told her that he would ''see you in court because you put me into something this big.'' The ILG filed amended charges with the Board, dated January 31, 1990. Prior charges filed with the Board in Case 29–CA–14495 on November 24, 1987 had made specific reference to Chalston's termination on November 15, 1989.[31]

Subsequently, Local 17-18 filed for arbitration on behalf of Chalston, resulting in her reinstatement on March 4, 1991. On her first day back to work, after an hour of work, Gary issued her a warning for speaking to other employees. The warning was for constantly talking to other workers.'' No other employees received such a warning, and with the exception of the above-described incidents regarding employees talking to Nieves, there is no evidence of any incidents of employees being told not to talk to other employees. As noted above in connection with Nieves, employees are constantly speaking to one another during the course of the workday, and are neither spoken to or disciplined about such activittes. Moreover, Chalston's unrebutted testimony establish that she had not been speaking to anyone in the hour that she had been working on that day.

After her reinstatement on March 4, 1991, and until Gary was replaced as supervisor by Asken Doug in May 1991, Gary began to supervise her more closely. Whenever Chalston would lift up her head from her work cutting threads to look around, Gary would clap his hands, and she would lower her head. Gary would do this about five times per day. He had never clapped his hands in this manner prior to Chalston's termination.

Chalston worked on March 4 and 5, and was told at the end of the day that there was no more work for her and not to come in on March 6, the next workday. Chalston worked a total of 3-1/2 days during the first week after her reinstatement, thereby losing 1-1/2 days of work. She was told by Gary that there was no work cutting threads. Chalston testified that other employees performing the cutting of threads during that week were also told not to come in because there was no work. Although other employees cutting threads were also told not to come to work, employees performing ticketing, and putting clothes on hangers were not laid off, even though Chalston had performed that work in the past. At least 10 of the floorworkers who were not laid off, and who were performing work such as ticketing and hanging, had less seniority than Chalston.

In May 1991, Gary was replaced as supervisor of the floor employees by Asian Doug. On May 13, 1991, work was slow cutting threads, so Doug assigned Chalston to ticket garments. At 10 a.m., while Chalston was ticketing garments, she observed Beirel speaking with Doug at the same time that they looked in her direction. Immediately after the conversation between Beirel and Doug, Doug reassigned Chalston to work on threads. In the late morning, Chalston and 19 other employees who had been performing thread cutting were told that there was no more work for them, and to call Respondents on May 20 to see if there is work available. As Chalston was leaving work at 12:30 p.m., she noticed that 10 employees out of the 20 employees who had been cutting threads, were still working.[32] On May 15 and 16, Chalston returned to the shop, and again noticed that the less senior employees, including the seven threaders whose layoff had been retracted, were still working for Respondents, performing jobs that Chalston had performed in the past.

Chalston called on May 20 as instructed and was told by Asian Doug to report on May 21 and she worked on May 21, 22, and 23. On May 23, Chalston was informed that

[30] Apparently at this time there was some sort of an ''affiliation'' vote pending involving Respondents' employees, Local 17-18 and the ILG. The record is not clear as to the precise nature of the vote, or who was conducting said vote, but it appears that it was not the NLRB because the petitions filed with the Board by the ILG has not resulted in any election being scheduled.

[31] On March 30, 1990, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating cases and consolidated complaint alleging, among other violations, that Respondents violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by issuing a warning to and discharging Chalston in December and November, respectively.

[32] The group of employees with less seniority than Chalston, also included 7 of the 10 employees who were cutting threads on May 13, and who were originally told to leave, but continued to work that day.

there was no work for her for Friday, May 24. On that day, when she received her paycheck, she and another employee complained to Doug about the fact that less senior workers were being permitted to remain at work. Doug replied, ''Forget it, I know what I am doing.'' Chalston worked the next week, and on Monday, June 3. At that time, she was laid off until June 10, when she returned to work.

In assessing whether General Counsel has met its *Wright Line* burden, it is essential that part of that burden include proof that Respondents had knowledge of the union activities engaged in by Chalston at the time of various alleged discriminatory acts taken against her. However, it is well established that ''knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn. . . . Such circumstances may include proof of knowledge of general union activity, the employer's demonstrated animus, the timing of the discharge, and the pretextual reasons for the discharge asserted by the employer.'' *BMD*, supra at 142–143.

Turning to the initial termination of Chalston, the evidence discloses that she was terminated on November 15, 3 days after she began soliciting employees to sign an ILG petition, and the same day that she was observed doing so by Arlene, a shop steward for Local 17-18, and told by Cathy Lopez who translates for Respondents, that someone had informed Gary about the petition and she was going to be fired. General Counsel and the complaint alleges that Arlene and Lopez are both agents of Respondents, and seeks to attribute knowledge of Chalston's union activities through these individuals to Respondents. I do not believe that General Counsel has adduced sufficient evidence that either Lopez or Arlene is an agent of Respondents, but I nonetheless am convinced that an inference that Respondents became aware of her protected activities prior to the November 15 termination is warranted.

Thus, I have found that Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by numerous acts of interrogations, threats, promises of benefit, creating the impression of surveillance, and the unlawful discharges of and other discriminatory conduct towards Nieves, Martinez, and Galarza in or about the same period of time. In addition, based on these violations it is clear that Respondents had general knowledge of employees' union activity. *BMD*, supra. I also conclude that the reason asserted by Respondents to Chalston for the initial discharge, that she ''was not needed anymore'' is clearly pretextual, inasmuch as Respondents were constantly hiring employees and had an ad in the paper for new employees at the time that it allegedly did not ''need'' Chalston. Moreover, when the Local 17-18 representative called Respondents, it appears that he was given a different and another pretextual reason for the discharge. Thus, it appears that he was given a reason of four absences over an 8-month period, which does not seem to be the real reason for Respondents' actions, since Chalston always called to notify Respondents about her absence, and she was neither spoken to nor warned about her absences by Respondents' officials.

These factors, coupled with the timing of the termination, coming on the same day that Chalston was observed soliciting for the ILG by a shop steward for Local 17-18, the Union favored by Respondents, as well as Chalston being informed by an employee that Respondents had been notified of her activities and that she would be fired, permits an inference which I drew that in fact Respondents were told about and were aware of Chalston's union activities prior to her discharge.[33]

Therefore, particularly in light of the absence of any legitimate basis for the discharge, *BMD*, supra, I conclude that General Counsel has established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to Chalston's discharge on November 15. Since Respondents have presented no evidence of why it terminated her on that day, they have not met their burden of demonstrating that the discharge would have occurred even in the absence of her protected conduct, and have therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

Turning to the written warning on December 11, I have found that Chalston signed this document, as a result of Jara's successful efforts to obtain her reinstatement. Since I have found the discharge itself on November 15, allegedly for the same pretextual reason, i.e., absences, to be unlawful, it follows that the warning that she was compelled to sign as the price of her reinstatement from this unlawful discharge is also unlawful. I so conclude, particular where once again Respondents have adduced no evidence as to why they issued the warning, or whether they would have taken the same action absent Chalston's union activities.

As to Respondents' decision to lay Chalston off, on January 19, 1990, it is noted that she continued her activities on behalf of the ILG, even after her reinstatement on December 11, 1989, as a result of the efforts of Local 17-18. Respondents' knowledge of this activity is in part dependent on the agency status of Maria Reina. Although I have concluded above that the mere fact that Reina was permitted to use Respondents' loudspeaker to make announcements on behalf of Local 17-18 is not sufficient in itself to make her an agent of Respondents, that finding is not dispositive of her status in this instance. Thus, I have found that Chalston observed Reina talking to Beirel in Beirel's office for 45 minutes. Immediately thereafter, Reina approached Chalston and told her that she was too smart to collect signatures for the ILG and if Beirel discovered this, she could be fired. In these circumstances, I conclude that coupling these events with the loudspeaker permission and the fact that Reina's statements mirrored similar remarks made by Beirel to other employees, tips the scale in favor of concluding that Chalston could reasonably construe Reina as speaking on behalf of Respondents with respect to these statements to Chalston. *EDP*, supra; *Wm. Chalston*, supra; *Community Cash*, supra. Therefore, it is appropriate to infer that Respondents become aware of Chalston's continued union activity between December 11, 1989, and January 19, 1990, when she was laid off.

However, even absent a finding of the agency status of Reina, I would still conclude that General Counsel had established a prima facie case that her layoff on January 19, 1990, was motivated by her union activity. Thus, Respondents' previous knowledge of her support for the ILG which resulted in her initial discharge on November 15,[34] coupled with the

[33] I need not decide specifically whether Arlene, Lopez, or someone else informed Respondents about Chalston's activities. I merely conclude based on the above factors that Respondents became aware of Chalston's activities on behalf of the ILG before it discharged her on November 15, 1989.

[34] I would also note that the ILG filed a charge with the Board on November 24, 1989, in Case 29–CA–14905, alleging that Respondents terminated Chalston on November 15 because of her

other contemporary unfair labor practices involving the other employees, is sufficient to so conclude, particularly where once again Respondents purported explanations do not withstand scrutiny. Thus, initially when Pablo notified Chalston of her layoff, he told her that there was ''no more work'' for her, which was clearly not the case, and was contradicted by Beirel who told her that she was merely laid off for a month, ''to take care of her sick child.'' Although Chalston had missed 2 days of work because of the sickness of her child, she had called in pursuant to company procedure to notify Respondents. Therefore, a finding is warranted that a motivating factor in the layoff of Chalston on January 19 was her activities on behalf of the ILG. Once again, Respondents have adduced no evidence as to why they laid her off on that date, and have not therefore met their burden of demonstrating that they would have laid off Chalston, absent her protected conduct. Therefore, they have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) once again.

On February 15, Chalston reported to work as initially ordered, at the conclusion of the 4-week layoff. Beirel, on February 15, after agreeing to allow her to return to work, on that date, changed his mind after reading some papers given to him by his secretary.

Since an amended charge was filed on January 31, 1990, I infer that Respondents received this document or some other Board document on February 15, which caused Beirel to change his mind about her recall, particularly since Beirel told Chalston that he would see her ''in court'' because she put him ''into something big.'' These facts are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, that Respondents' decision to refuse to recall Chalston on February 15, 1990, as they previously had agreed, was motivated by her. Because an amended charge was filed on January 31, 1990, I infer that Respondents received this document or some other Board document on February 15, which caused Beirel to change his mind about her recall, particularly since Beirel told Chalston that he would see her ''in court,'' because she put him ''into something big.'' These facts are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, that Respondents' decision to refuse to recall Chalston on February 15, 1990, as they previously had agreed, was motivated by her union activities, as well as the fact the charges had been filed on her behalf at the NLRB. Because, once more, Respondents have not been given an explanation as to why they took this action, they have again not met their *Wright Line* burden that they would not have recalled her on February 15, absent her protected conduct. Therefore, by this action, Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. I so find.

Chalston was finally recalled on March 4, 1991, after an arbitration award ordering her reinstatement. An hour after she commenced work on that day, she was issued a written warning for ''constantly talking with other workers.'' Because the only other instance in the record of employees being told not to talk to other employees was the unlawful instructions issued by Respondents that employees not speak to Nieves, and Chalston spoke to no one at all during the hour that she was working, I find the purported reason for this warning to be clearly pretextual. Coupling this with the previously found discrimination against Chalston and the other employees, a finding is warranted that Respondents' issuance of the warning on March 4, 1991, was motivated by both her activities on behalf of the ILG as well as the fact that charges were filed on her behalf with the NLRB. Because once more Respondents have failed to adduce any evidence of their reasons for the warning they have not met their *Wright Line* burden and have violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.

From March 4 to the date in May when Gary was replaced as supervisor by Asian Doug, Gary would supervise Chalston more closely, by clapping his hands whenever she would raise her head. Because this humiliating procedure had never been utilized by Gary, prior to her reinstatement, based on the above discrimination against Chalston, I conclude that again a prima facie case has been established that this action of Respondents was motivated by her as activities on behalf of the ILG, as well as the filing of Board charges on her behalf. Respondents' failure to offer any evidence of why they engaged in this practice, once more leads to the conclusion which I make, that they have failed to meet their *Wright Line* burden and have thereby violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.

Between March 6 and 8, Chalston was laid off for a total of 1-1/2 days. She was also laid off for part of the day on May 13 and June 3, and on May 14, 15, 16, 17, and 20 and June 4 through 7. On each of these days, the evidence does disclose that Respondents also laid off other employees performing threading, which was the work being performed by Chalston at the time. However, Chalston had also performed other types of floorworkers' work such as ticketing and hanging garments in the past. Employees performing these tasks were not laid off during the days that Chalston was laid off, notwithstanding the fact that Chalston had more seniority than many of these employees who continued to work.

Respondents' conduct in connection with the layoff on May 13 is particularly revealing and leads me to conclude that they signaled out Chalston for inclusion amongst the employees in all of the above-described layoffs for discriminatory reasons.

Thus, Supervisor Doug had on May 13, reassigned Chalston from cutting threads to ticketing garments. At 10 o'clock that morning, Chalston observed Beirel speaking with Doug and looking in her direction. Immediately thereafter, Doug reassigned her to cutting threads, and at 12:30 that day, the threaders were laid off. I find this sequence, particularly in the absence of any explanation for the reassignment of Chalston back to cutting threads, to be demonstrative of an intent by Respondents to make sure that Chalston was included in any possible layoff. I further find, that in view of the sordid history of Respondents' continuing discrimination against Chalston, from her November discharge, her December warning, her January layoff, the February refusal to recall, to the appalling practice of Pablo clapping his hands whenever Chalston looked up from her work, the reason for Respondents' action was Chalston's protected conduct. I also note in this regard the fact that as to this May 13 layoff, half of the 20 threaders who were originally told of their layoff, apparently were not laid off, and continued to work, while Chalston was laid off. This group of 10 threaders who continued to work, included 7 employees with less seniority than Chalston. Finally, Chalston also

knowledge of her support for the ILG by Respondents prior to the January layoff, as well as the unlawful warning issued on December 11, 1989, as detailed above.

was more senior than many other floorworkers who were not laid off during any of the intermittent layoffs of Chalston in March through June, even though Chalston had frequently performed other floorworker tasks such as ticketing and hanging. Indeed, as noted, she was performing ticketing on the morning of the May 13 layoff, before being reassigned to threading, as I have found make sure that she was included in the group of employees to be laid off.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, I conclude that General Counsel has established that a motivating factor for all the intermittent layoffs detailed above, from March through June of Chalston, was Chalston's protected activities. Inasmuch as once again Respondents have provided no explanations as to why they were so anxious to include Chalston in the layoffs, or any other evidence as to why she was laid off, while more senior employees were retained, they have not met their burden of establishing that they would have taken the same action against Chalston absent her protected conduct. Therefore, I find that Respondents have thereby violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.

H. *The Alleged Discrimination Against Silvia Silverio*

Silvia Silverio, after answering an ad in the newspaper, was hired by Respondents on April 18, 1991. When she arrived at 144 Spencer Street, she reported to the fifth floor where she was given a written application to fill out. The application called only for her name, address, and social security number, and did not request any information as to where Silverio had previously worked.

After Silverio completed the application and answered all the questions included therein, she was asked by Vicky to operate Respondents merrow machine for 1 hour. She completed work on a blouse, performing work on the shoulders, sleeves, and cuffs. After completing work on the blouse, Vicky told Silverio that she was a very good worker, and offered her a job as a pieceworker, starting on Monday, April 22, 1991. Neither Vicky nor any other official of Respondents asked Silverio where she had worked before.

In fact, Silverio had worked at a company called Rubies Costume, located at 120–08 Jamaica Avenue. At Rubies, Silverio had been involved in an ILG organizing campaign, and had signed up 70–75 employees for the ILG and was a member of the ILG organizing committee. Silverio was terminated on March 8, 1991. Subsequently, pursuant to charges filed by the ILG, a complaint was issued by the Region alleging that Silverio as well as a number of other employees were discriminatorily discharged because of their activities on behalf of the ILG. The trial in that case was scheduled to be heard on October 31, 1991.

On Monday, April 22, 1991, Silverio reported to work employees for Respondents as scheduled. Vicky explained to her that Respondents' work on a piecework system for the merrow machine operators, and that the employee is given bundles to work on, with each one containing a ticket. The employee on each Monday, was supposed to hand in all the ticket for each item that the employee completed to the office, so that their pay could be computed. Because Silverio started work on Monday, April 22, she was told to keep all her tickets for that week, and turn them in to the office on April 29, the next Monday.

Silverio worked for 3 days, April 22, 23, and 24, during which time Vicky was constantly complimenting her on the quality of her work, and told her two or three times a day that she was a very good machine operator, and she was doing a good job.

On Wednesday, April 24, at 4:30 p.m., Silverio was summoned to the office over the loudspeaker. She was spoken to by a secretary, and asked where she worked before Silverio did not tell the secretary that she worked at Rubies, because she feared that her ILG support would be disclosed if Respondents called Rubies. Therefore, she told the secretary about her prior job at Signe Star located at 523 Kent Avenue.

The next day, Silverio was again summoned over the loudspeaker by the same secretary. The secretary asked why Silverio hadn't told her that she (Silverio) had worked at Rubies Costume. Silverio replied that she didn't work at Rubies. The secretary responded that yes Silverio had worked at Rubies and told Silverio to give her Silverio's job tickets. Silverio replied that she didn't have them with her, and the secretary instructed her to bring them the next day.

The next day, April 26, Silverio worked until 4:30 p.m., when she was again summoned to the office over the loudspeaker, and then was asked by the secretary for her tickets. Silverio gave the secretary her tickets as instructed. The secretary told her that she ''didn't have more work there.'' Silverio went back to her machine to finish the bundle that she was working on. The secretary immediately called her into the office, and said to Silverio, ''I told you that you don't have more work here. I told you to leave.'' Silverio replied that she was finishing a bundle for which she had already given the ticket to Respondents. The secretary repeated that Silverio must leave because she didn't have any more work here. The secretary gave Silverio her check and told her, ''get out of here, get out of here.'' The last conversation between Silverio and the secretary occurred in the presence of other supervisors of Respondents in the office.

Silverio never told anyone at Respondents that she had worked at Rubies. However, starting on April 22, Silverio had been carrying in her work bag a copy of her 1989 tax return which included a W-2 form from Rubies. She had intended to apply for food stamps, which is why she was carrying these items with her in her work bag.

After her termination from Respondents, she decided not to apply for food stamps, so she placed her work bag in a locked closet in her apartment, until she worked in July 1991. At that point, she looked into her bag and discovered that her tax form and W-2 form which had been attached to the return for Rubies, were missing.

Respondents adduced no evidence as to why it terminated Silverio, nor as to how they found out she had worked at Rubies, or why they were concerned that she worked there. Respondents' attorney in their brief, however, contends that Silverio was ''discharged for lying on her employment application.''

It is once again necessary to apply the *Wright Line* criteria in evaluating the lawfulness of Respondents' termination of Silverio. Respondents' animus towards the protected activities of their employees is amply demonstrated by the above-described unfair labor practices that I have found, particularly the discrimination against Nieves, Chalston, Martinez, and Galarza. The timing of the discharge of Silverio in April 1991, comes in the midst of the continuation of Respondent's campaign of discriminatory treatment towards these employ-

ees. That leaves the question of Respondents' knowledge of Silverio's union activities, concerning which General Counsel has adduced no direct evidence.

As Respondents point out, General Counsel has not introduced any direct evidence that Respondents knew of Silverio's activities on behalf of ILG, while she worked at Rubies. Indeed, General Counsel has not even directly established that Respondents knew that there was any union activity at Rubies, or that Silverio was a subject of an NLRB complaint alleging her discharge was motivated by her ILG activities.

However, as noted above, it is well settled that absent direct evidence, knowledge may be proper by circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn. Some of these circumstances can include employers' demonstrated animus, the timing of the discharge, and the pretextual reasons asserted by the employer. *BMD*, supra at 143; *Hunter Douglas v. NLRB*, 808 F.2d 808, 814 (3d Cir. 1986); *Darbar Restaurant*, 288 NLRB 545 (1988); *Dr. Frederick Davidowitz, DDS*, 277 NLRB 1046, 1049 (1985); *Long Island Airport Limousine*, 191 NLRB 94, 95 (1971), affd. 468 F.2d 292, 295–296 (2d Cir. 1972).

Here, there can be no dispute that Respondents found out about the fact that Silverio had been employed at Rubies, and that this fact precipitated her termination. Thus, I need not and do not decide whether or not Respondents found out by rummaging through her bag, as urged by General Counsel, or by a phone call as suggested by Respondents, or by some other method.

Respondents contend that Silverio was fired for ''lying'' about her employment at Rubies. However, initially it must be noted that Respondents introduced no testimony or other evidence that Silverio was fired for lying, or why they even asked Silverio about her prior employment, or why they were concerned that she may have worked at Rubies. Moreover, contrary to Respondents' assertion, Silverio was not told that she was fired for lying, but that Respondents had no more work for her, which is clearly a pretextual reason, because there is no question that there was no shortage of work at the time, and Respondents concede that lack of work was not a reason for the termination, by their assertion that she was fired for lying.

However, Respondents' assertion that Silverio was terminated for ''lying,'' even if testimony had been given to substantiate such a claim, begs the question. Respondents have adduced no evidence of any legitimate reason as to why they asked about her prior employment, nor did any supervisor ask her about it prior to her hire. She performed well on the test administered to her operating the machine by Vicky, and was complemented by Vicky regularly on her work quality, during her 4 days of employment by Respondents.

Accordingly, in view of the animus of Respondents, the timing of the discharge, and in the absence of any legitimate basis for Respondents' concern about Silverio's employment at Rubies, I infer that Respondents, when they found out about her employment there, which they admit, also found out that the ILG had been organizing there, that Silverio was a union activist, and that an NLRB complaint had issued alleging her discharge to have been in violation of the Act. *BMD*, supra; *Hunter Dougles*, supra; *Long Island Limousine*, supra. Therefore, based on the foregoing, a prima case of discrimination with respect to Silverio has been established. Inasmuch as Respondents have introduced no evidence to meet their *Wright Line* burden, they have not established that they would have terminated Silverio absent her protected conduct, and have thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondents Three Sisters Sportswear Co., Bedford Cutting Mills, Inc., Three Sisters Apparel, Metropolitan Sweater Industries, Inc., United Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Ltd., Skylight Fashions, Inc., d/b/a Skylight Trading and 144 Spencer Realty Co. are single employers and alter egos of each other, and have been at all times an employer within the meaning of the Act.

2. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO (ILG) and Local 17-18, Production Workers Union, AFL–CIO are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.

3. Respondents, by ordering and instructing employees not to accept and to rip up literature from the ILG, referring to the ILG as the mafia, promising their employees benefits to assist them in soliciting support for Local 17-18 from other employees, threatening their employees with discharge, and closing of the factory if said employees supported the ILG or if the ILG came into the factory, threatening employees with unspecified reprisals if they spoke to employees who supported the ILG, interrogating their employees concerning their activities and support of the ILG, and creating the impression among their employees that their activities or the activities of their fellow employees on behalf of the ILG were under surveillance by Respondents, have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

4. Respondents, by promising their employees benefits in order to assist them in soliciting support for Local 17-18 from other employees, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.

5. Respondents, by on November 28, 1989, verbally abusing, blocking her from exiting, and discharging Carmen Nieves because of her support for and activities on behalf of and support of the ILG, and because she engaged in other protected concerted conduct, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

6. Respondents, by isolating the work station of Nieves from that of other employees, instructing their mechanic not to fix Nieves' machine at her request, assigning Nieves fewer bundles than those of other employees, forcing Nieves to wait longer than other employees to receive new bundles, assigning Nieves more complicated work than other employees, and supervising her more closely, all resulting in a reduction of earnings for Nieves, and by instructing other employees not to speak with Nieves, all because of Nieves' support for and activities on behalf of the ILG, and because she engaged in other protected conduct, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

7. Respondents, by verbally abusing, assaulting, and discharging Bella Martinez on December 1, 1989, because of her support for and activities on behalf of the ILG, and because of her exercise of other protected conduct, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

8. Respondents, by supervising Israel Galarza more closely, reducing his bonus in 1990, cutting his pay in March 1991, by constructively discharging Galarza on March 1,

1991, and by discharging Silvia Silverio on April 26, 1991, because Respondents believed or suspected that these employees supported the ILG, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

9. Respondents, by laying off Rosita Chalston on November 15, 1989, January 19, 1990, and intermittently between March and June 1991, refusing to recall her as promised on February 15, 1991, issuing written warnings to her on December 11, 1990, and on March 4, 1991, and by supervising her more closely by their supervisors clapping their hands when Chalston looked up from her work because of her support of and activities on behalf of the ILG, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

10. Respondents, by refusing to recall Chalston as promised on February 15, 1991, issuing a written warning to her on March 4, 1991, laying her off intermittently between March and June 1991, and by supervising her more closely by their supervisors clapping their hands when Chalston looked up from her work, because Chalston was the subject of an NLRB charge filed on behalf by the ILG, have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act.

11. Respondents have not violated the Act in any other manner as encompassed by the complaint.

12. Local 17-18 has not violated the Act as alleged in the complaint.

13. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

THE REMEDY

Having found that Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of the Act, I find it necessary to order them to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

Having found that Respondents unlawfully constructively discharged Israel Galarza and discharged Silvia Silverio, I recommend that Respondents be ordered to reinstate Galarza (at his prior salary) and Silverio, to their former positions of employment. Because I have also found that Respondents unlawfully laid off or discharged Carmen Nieves, Rosita Chalston, and Bella Martinez, I shall also recommend that Respondents make whole Nieves, Chalston, Martinez, Silverio, and Galarza for the discrimination against them.[35]

It is also appropriate to recommend that Respondents rescind the unlawful warnings issued to Chalston, and to remove from their files any references to unlawful warnings, discharges, or layoffs of all the discriminatees herein.

Charging Party requests a number of extraordinary remedies, which it deems essential to properly remedy Respondents' conduct. *Texas Super Foods*, 303 NLRB 209 (1991); *Monfort of Colorado*, 284 NLRB 1429, 1479 (1987); *Tidee Products*, 194 NLRB 1234–1235 (1972); *Heck's, Inc.*, 215 NLRB 765 (1974); *J. P. Stevens, Inc.*, 244 NLRB 407 (1979); *Autoprod, Inc.*, 265 NLRB 331 (1982).

[35] The discrimination against Nieves included various actions which reduced her employment opportunities, because she was a piece-rate worker. Galarza was discriminated against by having his pay and his 1990 bonus reduced. The make whole remedy shall include reimbursing the employees for these acts of discrimination by Respondents.

Charging Party requests that Respondents be ordered to reimburse it for attorneys' fees expended by Charging Party in connection with the litigation of the instant matter, including the district court enforcement proceedings that were necessary as a result of Respondents' refusal to comply with subpoenas of General Counsel. While recognizing that severe or outrageous unfair labor practices by itself do not warrant the imposition of such a remedy, *Workroom for Designers*, 274, NLRB 840, 841–842 (1985), Charging party argues that the standards of *Heck's*, supra, and *Tidee*, supra, which requires frivolous litigation for such a remedy has been met.

Charging Party contends in this regard, that because Respondents called no witnesses and presented no defense to any of the unfair labor practices alleged, their defenses do not even rise to the level of ''frivolous,'' because there has been no defense whatsoever. I cannot agree with Charging Party's construction of what constitutes ''frivolous'' litigation.

The Board has generally been very hesitant in awarding attorney's fees to the charging party. It is appropriate where Respondent has raised patently frivolous defenses. *Super Save*, 273 NLRB 20 fn. 1 (1984); *Park Inn Home for Adults*, 293 NLRB 1082 fn. 3 (1989); *Heck's*, supra at 762–768. A frivolous defense is not merely found to be without merit, but refers to contentions ''which are clearly meritless on their face.'' *Heck's, Inc.*, 191 NLRB 886, 889 (1971). Defenses are debatable rather than frivolous, where allegations are dependent on resolutions of credibility. *Heck's*, supra at 768; *Workroom*, supra at 842.

Although Respondents called no witnesses in this proceeding, they cross-examined General Counsel's witnesses vigorously, and were able to in some instances develop some inconsistencies and problems with the testimony of these witnesses. Thus, there were some significant inconsistencies between the testimony of Galarza and Nieves on pertinent matters, and the statements made by Respondents' officials to employees were made in English to Spanish-speaking employees, which also raises some questions as to the ability of the employees to understand and/or recount what was said to them. While I have rejected Respondents' arguments that for these and other reasons, the employees' testimony should not be credited, I do not deem their assertions in this regard to be frivolous.

Moreover, I also note that some of the violations here were supported and in some cases found solely based on the affidavit of Funez. Because she could not recall any of the alleged statements made to her by Respondents' officials in her affidavit, the allegations significantly supported by such evidence are not free from doubt. Thus, while I relied on Funez' affidavit for substantive evidence, this finding is not open and shut, since Funez could not even recall giving the affidavit in the first place.

Additionally, while Respondents gave no evidence as to the reasons for their alleged discriminatory actions, some of these complaint allegations were far from clearcut. Thus, the question of knowledge with respect to the discharge of Silverio is certainly not free from doubt, and similarly the initial layoff of Chalston took place before any direct evidence of Respondents' knowledge of her protected conduct. Indeed, the agency status of Maria Reina, which is also somewhat questionable, was relied on in part to establish union activity prior to Chalston's second unlawful layoff.

It is also noteworthy that much of the litigation herein, dealt with the single employer–alter ego issues. In that area, although Respondents called no witnesses, General Counsel called a number of officials and representatives of Respondents as its own witnesses. In that connection, Respondents cross-examined these witnesses, and introduced documentary evidence on this subject.

While I have concluded as detailed above that the various entities did constitute a single employer and an alter ego, Respondents' position that General Counsel had not established its case, cannot be construed as frivolous. This points up the flaw in Charging Party's argument. Once General Counsel has presented its case, Respondents are permitted to make a judgment that a prima facie case has not been made, either because of credibility problems, or legal insufficiency or some combination of both. As long as there is some rational basis for that decision, I do not believe that a Respondent can be subject to an order for attorney fees, merely because its judgment in that regard is later found to be in error.

Finally, Charging Party points to the need to resort to the United States district court for subpoena enforcement, including sanctions for criminal contempt concerning which charging party claims it was actively involved. Charging Party characterizes the positions taken by Respondents in regard to and in those proceedings to be ''nothing more than a frivolous attempt to prevent the Board from obtaining the documents which exposed their alter ego status.'' I do not agree.

Respondents did not make a blanket refusal to comply with the various subpoenas. They raised legitimate issues for their noncompliance in each instance. They initially refused to comply because General Counsel sought information for corporations such as Southland which were not named as Respondents in this case. Although I refused to quash the subpoenas, finding that General Counsel's arguments as to relevance to be persuasive, I made that decision with some hesitation, and certainly cannot find Respondents' position in that regard to be frivolous.

Similarly, Respondents further refusal to comply, resulting in the contempt proceeding, was also based on a legitimate, although meritless objection. Here, Respondents would not turnover the materials so ordered by the district court, because General Counsel would not agree that Charging Party should not be given access to the documents. While I and the district court again rejected these contentions by Respondents, I again find their position to be debatable and not frivolous.

So, in sum I do not believe that the mere fact that Respondents called no witnesses is sufficient, as Charging Party contends, to establish a frivolous defense. I conclude that Respondents did raise some legitimate contentions with respect to General Counsel's case, and although I have rejected most of Respondents' arguments,[36] I find that their positions were debatable and not frivolous, and do not warrant the imposition of the extraordinary remedy of attorney's fees. *Heck's*, supra; *National Roof Systems*, 305 NLRB 965 (1991); *Workroom*, supra; *Super Save*, supra; *Park Inn*, supra. See also *G. T. Knight Co*., 268 NLRB 469 (1983); and *Rosehill Cemetery Assn*., 281 NLRB 425, 426 fn. 5 (1986), where even in summary judgment cases, where no litigable issues had been raised, the Board did not order the payment of attorney's fees, although it was requested to do so.

The cases cited by Charging Party in support of its request, *Tidee*, supra, *Texas Super*, supra, *Autoprod*, supra, are not dispositive, since they all involve clearly frivolous defenses which had been previously decided or were similar and directly related to the unfair labor practices found in a long history of prior violations against the same Respondent. *C. F. Eckert, Inc*. 301 NLRB 868 (1991), is more persuasive, but is still in my view distinguishable and not controlling here. While the Board did rely in part on the fact that the Respondent in Eckert supra presented no defense to the complaint, the nature of the case and Respondent's conduct, therein, quite different from the instant matter. Thus, Eckert involved a clear cut and rather routine case of refusal to make payments into the Union's funds. The Respondent there initially signed a settlement agreement, but then refused to comply, compelling the revocation of the agreement and the new complaint. The Board emphasized the Respondent's failure to comply with the settlement, as well as its failure to present any evidence, or even cross-examine any witnesses during the trial. Thus, it is obvious the Board was convinced that the Respondent therein knew that it had no debatable or legitimate defense to the allegations of a clear cut and rather simple case.

These facts are not present in the instant matter, as I have concluded that Respondents vigorously cross-examined all witnesses, raised credibility problems, and some did introduce some evidence through General Counsel's witnesses, all contributing to a number of issues that were far from clear cut, and some quite questionable. Therefore, I find *Eckert*, supra, to be distinguishable, and shall not recommend the awarding of attorney's fees to Charging Party.

Charging Party also requests the reimbursement of organizing expenses to it, citing *J. P. Stevens*., supra, and *Autoprod*, supra. Charging Party argues that since Respondents have been found to be a single employer with and alter ego of Southland-Metro, this demonstrates the behavior and continuous flouting of Board and court orders, found in *J. P. Stevens* to be sufficient to warrant such a remedy.

Ordinarily, organizational expenses, like attorney's are awarded by the Board only where the Respondents have engaged in frivolous litigation. *Heck's*, supra at 766; *Wellman Industries*, 248 NLRB 325 (1980).

However, in exceptional cases, such as *J. P. Stevens*, supra, where a long history of flagrant disregard of prior Board and court orders are present, such an award has been granted. Since I have already concluded that Respondents did not engage in frivolous litigation, it must be decided whether the facts here fit within the *J. P. Stevens* rationale.

I agree with Charging Party that Respondents have committed flagrant and serious violations here, and that some of them are similar to the violations found in the prior case. However, I do not believe that either the conduct here or the frequency of the violations approaches the record of *J. P. Stevens*, supra, which warranted such a remedy. Because even flagrant violations as here do not justify the imposition of a remedy of organizing expense, *Workroom*, supra at 374, one prior case involving similar violations, nearly 20 years ago, is not sufficient to bring this case under the precedent established in *J. P. Stevens*, supra. See *Edwin R. O'Neill*,

[36] I would note that I have dismissed a few of the complaint allegations for various reasons, including the failure to establish supervisory or agency status.

288 NLRB 1394 (1988), where prior violations by an employer alter ego were denied insufficient to justify extraordinary remedies, including expenses.

Charging Party also requests that Beirel Jacobowitz be personally ordered to read the notice to employees, *Texas Foods*, supra; *United Dairy Farmers' Coop*., 242 NLRB 1026, 1029 (1979), as well as the invocation of the Board's special mail and publishing remedies. *Texas Foods*, supra; *Monfort of Colorado*, 284 NLRB 1429 (1987).

The Board, supported by the courts, have ordered such remedies, where the conduct of the employers involved was so flagrant and pervasive, that they are likely to have a continuing coercive effect on the free exercise by employees of their Section 7 rights, virtually foreclosing the possibility of holding a fair election. *Monfort of Colorado*, 298 NLRB 73, 86 (1991); *Workroom*, supra, 274 NLRB at 841; *Monfort of Colorado*, 284 NLRB 1429, 1430 (1987), 852 F.2d 1344, 1347–1349 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *United Supermarkets*, 261 NLRB 1291, 1293 (1982); *Loray Corp*., 189 NLRB 557, 558–559 (1970); *Haddon House Foods*, 242 NLRB 1057, 1058–1059 (1990), affd. in pertinent part. 640 F.2d 392, 399–404 (D.C. Cir. 1981); *NLRB v. S. E. Nichols, Inc*., 862 F.2d 952, 962 (2d Cir. 1988); *NLRB v. Unional Nacional de Trabajadores*, 540 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1976); *Gourmet Foods*, 270 NLRB 578, 587 (1984).

I agree with Charging Party that Respondents here have committed flagrant and extensive unfair labor practices so that the mere posting of a notice will not be sufficient to make the employees individually aware of their statutory rights to select a union of their own choosing. *Loray*, supra at 558; *Monfort*, supra, 289 NLRB at 1429–1430.

Here, Respondents have discriminatorily laid off or discharged five unit employees, including a leading adherent of the ILG, Carmen Nieves. Respondents' conduct with respect to Nieves was particularly reprehensible, inasmuch as it included a barrage of obscenities plus physically blocking her from leaving the office at the time of her discharge, by David and Beirel Jacobowitz, their two highest officials.

Similarly, when Respondents terminated Bella Martinez, Respondents by Beirel also subjected her to humiliating insults (referring to cockroaches and insects), plus a physical assault by removing her chair from under her and pushing her.

Additionally, after unlawfully terminating Rosita Chalston on two occasions, and being forced to reinstate her after an arbitration, Respondents continued to discriminate against her in several ways, including the almost inhuman practice of a supervisor clapping his hands whenever she looked up from her work.

Additionally, I would note that most of the 8(a)(1) statements, including threats of discharge and plant closure, were made by Beirel. Beirel was also personally involved in the disgraceful conduct detailed above at the time of the discharges of Nieves and Martinez, as well as the constructive discharge of Galarza. Thus, I conclude that the mere posting of a notice by Respondents will not be sufficient to make employees individually aware of his statutory rights and that his exercise of such rights will be respected by Respondents.

Accordingly, it is recommended that in addition to posting copies of the notice, that Beirel Jacobowiz, Respondents' chief executive, who was responsible for and directly implicated in most of the violations found, be ordered to personally sign the notices, and to personally read the attached notice at assembled meetings in which all employees will be reached, ''directly placing on the notice the imprimatur of the person most responsible for the illegal acts in question,'' *Loray*, supra, and that because Respondents ''unlawful campaign emanated from the top, so too must reassurances that this company campaign will end come from the top.'' *United Dairy*, supra at 1029. See also *Haddon House*, supra at 1058; *United Supermarkets*, supra at 1294.

It is also appropriate to order Respondents to sign and mail copies of the notice to all its present employees as well as to all employees on their payroll since Respondents began its course of unlawful conduct in November 1989. *United Supermarkets*, supra at 1294, *Workroom*, supra, 274 NLRB at 841; *Loray*, supra at 558; *United Dairy*, supra at 1029; *Monfort*, supra, 248 NLRB 86, 88.

I also find that it is appropriate to order Respondents to publish a copy of the notice in two local newspapers of general circulation, including ''El Diario,''[37] twice weekly for a period of 4 weeks. *Monfort*, supra, 298 NLRB at 88; *Monfort*, supra, 284 NLRB 1429, 1479; *United Dairy*, supra at 1029; *Haddon House*, supra at 1058.

Charging Party also requests a number of other special remedies providing for reasonable access to Respondents' premises and bulletin boards by the ILG in certain situations, plus supplying the ILG with names and addresses of their current employees. These remedies are traditionally provided by the Board, where as here, Respondents have engaged in flagrant and pervasive conduct rendering the possibility of fair election remote, and I find it appropriate to so recommend. *Monfort*, supra, 298 NLRB at 86; *United Dairy*, supra at 1031; *United Supermarkets*, supra at 1293; *Haddon House*, supra at 1058–1059. These access provisions which I shall recommend shall apply for a period of 2 years from the posting of the notice, or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a free and fair election, whichever comes first. *Monfort*, supra; *Haddon House*, supra.

Finally, because I found flagrant unfair labor practices to have been committed by Respondents, a broad cease-and-desist order is required. *Hickmott Food*, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended[38]

ORDER

The Respondents, Three Sisters Sportswear Co., Bedford Cutting Mills, Inc., Three Sisters Apparel Corp., Metropolitan Sweater Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries, Inc., United Knitwear Industries Ltd., Skylight Fashions, Inc., d/b/a Skylight Trading and 144 Spencer Realty Corp., Brooklyn, New York, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall jointly and severally

1. Cease and desist from

[37] I note that a substantial number of employees of Respondents are Spanish speaking, and the record establishes that some of them saw Respondents' ads in that newspaper.

[38] If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

(a) Laying off, discharging, issuing written warnings to or otherwise discriminating against any employee because of their support for or activities on behalf of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL–CIO or because their employees engaged in other protected concerted activity, or because a charge has been filed on behalf of their employees with the National Labor Relations Board.

(b) Verbally abusing, physically assaulting, blocking employees from exiting their office, isolating the work stations of employees, instructing their mechanics not to fix machines of employees on request, making more complicated and fewer assignments to employees, forcing employees to wait longer for assignments than other employees, supervising employees more closely, instructing employees not to speak with other employees, reducing the bonus or the pay of employees, or having their supervisors clapping their hands whenever an employee looks up from their work, because of their employees support for or activities on behalf of the ILG, or because they engaged in other protected concerted activity, or because a charge has been filed on behalf of their employees at the National Labor Relations Board.

(c) Ordering and instructing employees not to accept and to rip up literature from the ILG, referring to the ILG as the mafia, promising employees benefits to assist them in soliciting support for Local 17-18 from other employees, threatening employees with discharge or closing of the factory if said employees support the ILG or if the ILG came into the factory, threatening employees with unspecified reprisals if they speak to employees who support the ILG, questioning employees concerning their activities on behalf of or support for the ILG, or creating the impression among their employees that their activities or the activities of their fellow employees on behalf of the ILG were under surveillance by Respondents.

(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Offer Israel Galarza, and Silvia Silverio immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.

(b) Make whole Galarza, Silverio, Carmen Nieves, Bella Martinez, and Rosita Chalston for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, including the reduction of work opportunities for Nieves and the reduction of Galarza's pay and bonus, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.

(c) Remove from their files any references to the unlawful actions taken against Silverio, Nieves, Chalston, Martinez, and Galarza, and notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that the actions will not be used against them in any way.

(d) Restore the pay of Israel Galarza to what it had been prior to its reduction in March 1991, plus any raises which he may have received since that time.

(e) Rescind in writing the instruction that their employees are no longer allowed to speak with Carmen Nieves, and the instructions that her machine will not be fixed by the mechanic at her request, notify Nieves in writing that this has been done, and distribute a copy of this notice of recission to all employees.

(f) Restore the work station of Nieves to what it had been prior to her termination on November 19, 1989.

(g) Restore their practice which had been in effect prior to November 19, 1989, of assigning Nieves to an amount of bundles equal to that of other employees.

(h) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.

(i) Mail copies of the attached notice marked ''Appendix''[39] on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by Beirel Jacobowitz, Respondents' chief operating official, to each and every employee working at its Brooklyn, New York plant on the date on which such notice is mailed, as well as to each and every employee who worked or should have worked in its plant during the period of the Respondent's unfair labor practices. Additional copies of the notice shall be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(j) Mail and post in the same manner as described above a Spanish-language translation of the English-language notice. The Regional Director for Region 29 of the Board will provide copies of the Spanish-language translation for posting by the Respondent.

(k) Publish in two newspapers of general circulation including El Diario, copies of the attached notice marked ''Appendix.'' Such notice shall be published twice weekly for a period of 4 weeks.

(l) Convene during working time all employees at the Brooklyn plant, by shifts, departments, or otherwise, and have Beirel Jacobowitz, read to the assembled employees the contents of the attached notice marked ''Appendix.'' The Board shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to provide for the attendance of a Board agent at any assembly of employees called for the purpose of reading such notice.

(m) On request of the ILG made within 1 year of the issuance of the Order here, make available to the ILG without delay a list of names and addresses of all employees at the time of the request.

(n) Immediately on request of the ILG, for a period of 2 years from the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, grant the ILG and its representatives reasonable access to the Brooklyn, New York plant bulletin boards and all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.

(o) Immediately on request of the ILG, for a period of 2 years from the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate cer-

[39] If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading ''Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board'' shall read ''Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.''

tification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, permit a reasonable number of union representatives access for reasonable periods of time to nonwork areas, including but not limited to canteens, cafeterias, rest areas, and parking lots, within its Brooklyn, New York plant so that the ILG may present its views on unionization to the employees, orally and in writing, in such areas during changes of shift, breaks, mealtimes, or other nonwork periods.

(p) In the event that during a period of 2 years following the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted, or until the Regional Director has issued an appropriate certification following a fair and free election, whichever comes first, any supervisor or agent of Respondents convenes any group of employees at the Respondents' Brooklyn plant and addresses them on the question of union representation, give the ILG reasonable notice thereof and afford two union representatives a reasonable opportunity to be present at such speech and, on request, give one of them equal time and facilities to address the employees on the question of union representation.

(q) In any election which the Board may schedule at the Respondent's Brooklyn plant within a period of 2 years following the date on which the aforesaid notice is posted and in which the ILG is a participant, permit, on request by the ILG, at least two union representatives reasonable access to the plant and appropriate facilities to deliver a 30-minute speech to employees on working time, the date thereof to be not more than 10 working days but not less than 48 hours prior to any such election.

(r) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply.

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed as to allegations not specifically found herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint in Case 29–CB–7505 against Local 17-18 United Production Workers' Union, AFL–CIO is dismissed.